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1. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Exclusive dealing is a form of vertical restraint. That is, 
a restraint irrposed by a person in one functional rrarket, 
eg, a supplier, on a person in another functional rrarket, 
eg, a distributor. 
Vertical restraints on purchasing corre in three forms: 
exclusive dealing, requirerrents contracts and tying 
arrangerrents. The essence of such arrangerrents is that 
the distributor's freedom to purchase whatever product, 
from whatever sources, in whatever quantity he or she 
chooses, is curtailed. 
Exclusive dealing arrangerrents (EDAs) cane about by agreerrent 
between the parties, al though sare inequality of bargaining 
po~r on the part of the distributor rray well be evident. 
The terms of EDAs vary enonrously. Exarrples include 
agreerrents that: 
- require the distributor to stock the whole range of 
the supplier's products; or 
- allow the distributor to specify what products from 
the range he or she will stock, but require that the 
distributor stock the supplier's brand exclusively; 
or 
- provide that the distributor will stock only the supplier's 
brand of a particular product. 
Requirerrents contracts allow a distributor access to a 
product if the distributor agrees to purchase all, or 
substantially all, of its requirerrents of the product 
from the supplier. 
Tying arrangerrents require a distributor who wants to 
purchase one of the supplier's products to purchase 
sarething else at the sarre tirre. For exarrple, in order 
to obtain a coffee rrachine, a distributor might have to 
purchase all of its supplies of coffee from the supplier. 
2. 
This kind of arrangerrent is also known as full line forcing. 
If the distributor is required to purchase additional 
goods or services from a third party, that is a third 
line forcing agreerrent. 
This paper is concerned with exclusive dealing arrangerrents 
because that was the kind of arrangerrent involved in the 
only New Zealand case to date of a vertical restraint 
on purchasing: Sirrpson Appliances (NZ) Ltd v Fisher & 
1 
Paykel Ltd . 
Fisher & Paykel Ltd (F&P) is the only New Zealand 
rranufacturer of whiteware, ie, refrigerators, freezers, 
dishwashers, washing rrachines and driers. The corrpany 
retails its products through approximately 190 franchised 
dealers covering approximately 450 of an estirrated total 
of 800 retail outlets in New Zealand. 
Each F&P franchised dealer is required to sign a contract 
containing an exclusive dealing clause (EOC) that reads: 
"5. (a) You will not stock, display or sell any 
product of the type listed in Schedule 
1 other than that legitirrately carrying 
the brand-narre(s) listed in that schedule." 
In addition, the standard contract be~en F&P and its 
dealers requires, arrong other things, that the dealer 
will honour the warranty and provide after-sales service 
during the products' life. Ninety days' notice in writing 
is required to terminate the agreerrent. 
F&P products account for 85 percent of whitegoods sold 
in New Zealand. Seventy-five percent of the products 
are sold through F&P dealers covered by the EOC, while 
the other 10 percent are F&P products rranufactured under 
the Shacklock brand and sold through non-F&P franchised 
stores. 
It is necessary to describe briefly the changes to 
corrpetition law and conditions in the whitegoods industry 
3. 
that led to the litigation in this case. 
The Acts that were the predecessors of the Comrerce Act 
1986 did not llBke exclusive dealing illegal. Section 50 
of the Cormerce Act 1975 made it illegal to engage in 
full line or third line forcing only. As will be explained 
in rrore detail in the next section of this paper, although 
the Cornrerce Act 1986 does not deal specifically with 
exclusive dealing, it can fall within one of the general 
provisions of the Act covering restrictive trade practices. 
That change in the law being of recent origin it is not 
surprising to find that EDAs have been used in the New 
Zealand whitegoods industry for many years. Fisher & 
Paykel Ltd and its dealers have operated using an EDC 
for 40 years. While General l\btors Ltd manufactured 
whitegoods in New Zealand it distributed its products 
under EDAs. McAlpine Industries Ltd, a company that 
distributed whitegoods, also used an exclusive dealing 
network, until it was bought out by Ceraroco Corporation 
Ltd in 1986. 
The whitegoods industry in New Zealand has only recently 
emerged from a long period of protection. In 1938 inport 
licensing controls were inposed. The policy was not to 
grant licenses for the .irrportation of goods that were 
being manufactured in New Zealand. However, in 1969 a 
special arrangerrent under NAFTA provided controlled access 
for goods of Australian origin, to caq)lerrent New Zealand 
, 
production. In line with the general trend towards the 
deregulation of industry, since 1984 inport controls in 
the whitegoods industry have been gradually rerroved. 
They were finally phased out on 30 June 1988. Under the 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (CER for short) Australian whitegoods becarre 
licence exerrpt and duty free fran 1 July 1987. Further 
reductions in tariffs on whitegoods fran other countries 
are to occur in the future. 
4. 
Fisher & Paykel Ltd is now the only New Zealand rranufacturer 
of whitegoods, with its corrpetition coming from i.rrported 
whitegoods. 
It was the corrbination of the law changes, the changing 
CX)nditions in the whitegoods indust:r:y, and corrpetitors 
jostling for position in the rrarketplace alongside an 
established corrpany using exclusive dealing that set the 
scene for litigation over the corrpetitive effects of that 
practice. 
The catalyst for F&P applying to the Comrerce Cornnission 
to have its exclusive dealing practice authorised was 
the confrontation it had with Bond & Bond Ltd, a corrpany 
with which F&P had been associated with for 50 years. 
Bond & Bond Ltd had a current franchise agreerrent with 
F&P signed on 14 Noverrber 1980, covering its 34 stores 
nationwide. On 18 October 1986 Bond & Bond Ltd opened 
a store called "Electric City" in Panrrure, Auckland, stocking 
a wide range of electrical goods. Claiming to want to 
give custarers as rruch choice as possible it started 
selling irrported whitegoods in that shop side by side 
with F&P whitegoods. 
Correspondence and discussion between the parties ensued, 
but failed to resolve the rratter. F&P, which regarded 
Bond & Bond's action as a deliberate flouting of the EDA, 
sought to enforce the contract between the parties by 
refusing to supply its whitegoods to the "Electric City" 
shop,or to deliver them to Bond & Bond Ltd's warehouse, 
which was the central distribution point for all the corrpany's 
shops. F&P was prepared to deliver its whitegoods direct 
to Bond & Bond Ltd' s shops other than "Electric City" . 
The problem with that was, those shops had limited storage 
space. 
Bond & Bond Ltd responded by bringing an action under 
5. 
section 81 of the Comrerce Act 1986 for an interim 
injunction alleging F&P had breached sections 27 and 36 
of the Act. At the hearing in the High Court
2 
Barker J 
accepted a submission that, whatever the rrerits of granting 
an interim injunction based on section 27, the Court could 
not do so because the transitional provisions in section 
111 prevented it. On the action based on the alleged 
breach of section 36 the High Court found that Bond & 
Bond Ltd had rrade out a serious question to be tried -
that a substantial reason for F&P taking the action it 
had was to enforce its dominant position. Ho~ver, the 
Court found that the balance of convenience favoured F&P, 
because if the injunction was granted and F&P won the 
substantive action, it would be alrrost irrpossible to 
restore the relationship F&P had built up with its custorrers 
over the years. Against this, Bond & Bond Ltd would suffer 
limited darrage from being unable to sell F&P whitegoods 
in its "Electric City" store until the substantive action 
had been decided. 
An irrportant reason for the Court deciding not to grant 
an interim injunction was, during the hearing F&P had 
indicated it was willing to deliver whitegoods to Bond 
& Bond Ltd's warehouse if the corrpany would undertake 
not to sell F&P whitegoods in any shop where it sold other 
!lfillufacturer's whitegoods. The Court required Bond & 
Bond Ltd to give such an undertaking. 
In concluding his judgrrent in the Bond & Bond case Barker 
J drew attention to the fact that once the transitional 
provisions relating to section 27 expired on 1 March 1987, 
Bond & Bond Ltd was free to plead a fresh cause of action 
against F&P based on section 27.
3 
The possibility of that happening prarpted F&P to apply 
to the Carrrerce Coomission for authorisation of its EOC. 
As will be explained in rrore detail in Part 2, authorisation 
gives parties to the practice imnunity from actions in 
6. 
the courts alleging that their practice contravenes the 
Act. 
F&P's application for authorisation was received by the 
Carrrerce Conmission on 27 February 1987. In accordance 
with the provisions of the Act the Carrnission investigated 
the practice, issued a draft detennination and held a 
conference on the draft detennination involving interested 
parties. 
In a majority decision on the authorisation application 
the Conmission concluded that F&P's EOC did substantially 
lessen CClrTl)eUtion in the market for the retail distribution 
of whitegoods. It further found that the public benefits 
resulting fran the practice did not outweigh the lessening 
of carpetition, so it could not authorise the practice.
4 
The dissenting rrember of the Conmission did not find it 
necessary to consider the public benefit test because 
she found that the practice did not substantially lessen 
CClrTl)etition in the market, principally because F&P was 
constrained in its actions by potential corrpetition.
5 
F&P appealed the Carrnission's decision to the High Court 
under section 92 of the Comrerce Act 1986. On 24 July 
1989 Barker J consolidated the appeal with a proceeding 
brought in the Carrrercial List by Sirrpson Appliances (NZ) 
Ltd and Email Ltd (Sirrpson/Email) for a declaration that 
the EOC contravened section 27 of the Act.
6 
F&P 
counterclairred against Sirrpson/Email, the Comrerce 
Carrnission and Bond & Bond Ltd for a declaration that 
the EOC did not contravene section 27. 
The judgrrent of the High Court (Barker J and R G Blunt) 
was handed down on 27 April 1990.
7 It found in favour 
of F&P, that the EOC did not substantially lessen 
coopetition in the rrarket. 
7. 
This paper will: 
- outline the scherre of the Ccxrrrerce Act 1986 as it relates 
to section 27 and authorisation applications, with 
particular reference to the practice of exclusive dealing; 
- discuss the rrode of analysis laid down in the cases 
by the Ccxrrrerce Corrrnission and the High Court to give 
fonn to the general words of the Act; 
- analyse the F&P case to ascertain what principles corre 
out of that case; and 
detennine whether a general section in the nature of 
section 27 of the Ccxrrrerce Act 1986 is effective to 
cover the practice of exclusive dealing or whether New 
Zealand should consider adopting a section specifically 
covering exclusive dealing similar to section 47 of 
the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. 
8. 
2. SCHEME OF THE Ca1MERCE ACT 1986 
The Long Title to the Comrerce Act 1986 states that it 
is: 
"An Act to prorrote corrpetition in rrarkets within 
New Zealand. " 
Although not expressly stated in the Act, the Act is 
one of a nurrber of Governrrent policy initiatives airred 
at enhancing economic efficiency.
8 This link between 
corrpetition and efficiency was m3.de explicit by the Court 
of Appeal in Tru-Tone Ltd v Festival Records Marketing 
Ltd: 
"[The Long Title of the Carrrerce Act] is based on 
the premise that society's resources are best 
allocated in a corrpetitive rrarket where rivalry 
between firms ens~s maximum efficiency in the 
use of resources." 
Restrictive Trade Practices (RTPs) are governed by Part 
II of the Act. Exclusive dealing is not one of the 
practices the Act specifically deals with. If exclusive 
dealing is to be caught by the Act it nust fall within 
the arrbit of me of the general sections covering RTPs, 
section 27 or section 36. This is in contrast to the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 on which the New 
Zealand Carrrerce Act 1986 was based. Section 47 of the 
Trade Practices Act sets out quite specifically what 
constitutes exclusive dealing. l\bre will be said about 
this section in Part 12 of the paper. 
It is not intended to enter into a discussion on how 
section 36 of the Carrrerce Act ¼Duld apply in any exclusive 
dealing case brought under that section. That is best 
left until such a case arises. Note, oowever, that section 36 
has a narrow application: 
"36. (1) No person who has a dominant position 
in a rrarket shall use that position for the purpose 
of -
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into 
that or any other rrarket; or 
9. 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from 
engaging in corrpetitive conduct in that or 
in any other market; or 
( c) Eliminating any person from that or any other 
market." 
The section only applies if the supplier is in a "dominant 
position" in a market. Those ~rds have been interpreted 
to rrean that the coopany must have a "dominant influence
1110 , 
a "coomanding influence"
11 or "the po~r to behave 
independently
1112 • 
Section 3(8) defines what a "dominant position in a market" 
is as follows: 
"For the purposes of sections 36, 66 and 67 of this 
Act, a dominant position in a market is one in which 
a person as a supplier or an acquirer of goods or 
services either alone or together with any inter-
connected bcx:1y corporate is in a position to exercise 
a daninant influence over the production, acquisition, 
supply, or price of goods or services in that market 
and for the purposes of determining whether a person 
is in a position to exercise a dominant influence 
over the production, acquisition, supply, or price 
of goods or services in a market regard shall be 
had to -
(a) The share of the rrarket, the technical 
knowledge, the access to rraterials or 
capital of tlHt person or that person together 
with any interconnected bcx:1y corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained 
by the conduct of corrpetitors or potential 
carpetitors in that market: 
(c) The extent to which that person is constrained 
by the conduct of suppliers or acquirers 
of goods or services in that market." 
Those factors are not exhaustive. In !'€ws Ltd/Independent 
13 !'€wspapers Ltd the Comrerce Carrnission provided an 
extended list of factors that could be relevant in deciding 
whether a person is in a daninant position in a market. 
The F&P case was argued under section 27(2). Therefore, 
this paper will concentrate on the requirerrents under 
that section, which states: 
"No person shall give effect to a provision of a 
contract, arrangerrent, or understanding that has 
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, 
of substantially lessening <:X)[ll)etition in a market." 
10. 
A provision of a contract, arrangerrent or understanding 
that falls for consideration under section 27 will not 
be illegal unless it is sufficiently anti-coopetitive 
to warrant intervention under the Act, ie, unless it 
substantially lessens c::c:,npetition. 
If a person thinks a provision of a contract, arrangement 
or understanding they want to give effect to may or ¼Duld 
contravene section 27(2), it is open to them to apply 
to the Camerce Carrnission for authorisation of the 
provision under section 58(2). Section 61(6)(b) provides 
that the Coomission may grant authorisation if the benefit 
to the public that will or will be likely to arise from 
giving effect to the provision ¼Duld outweigh any detrirrent 
that would result. The effect of authorisation being 
granted is that the person is free to give effect to 
or to enforce the provision (section 58(1)(a)). That 
rreans they will be imnune from any action brought against 
them in the courts alleging the provision contravenes 
section 27(2). 
If a provision of a contract, arrangerrent or understanding 
that contravenes section 27(2) is proceeded with without 
being authorised (either because no application for 
authorisation is made, or because the Coomission has 
refused to grant authorisation because insufficient public 
benefit has been shown to result from the provision) 
the person runs the risk that the Coomission or a private 
litigant might bring an action in the High Court 
(Administrative Division) alleging contravention of section 
27(2). A successful action by the Coomission may attract 
pecuniary penalties of up to $500,000 in the case of 
an individual and up to $5,000,000 in the case of a body 
corporate (section 80). Private litigants who can show 
loss or damage caused by the defendant's conduct are 
entitled to damages (section 82). 
ll. 
The general rule found in section 59(l)(a) is that the 
Carrnission has no power to grant authorisation in respect 
of a contract or arrangerrent that has been entered into, 
or an understanding arrived at, refore the Carrnission 
makes a determination on the authorisation application. 
There are h.D exceptions to that rule. Firstly, under 
section 35 it is possible to enter into a contract to 
which section 27 applies that contains a condition providing 
that the provision will not care into effect until 
authorisation has been granted. Application for authorisation 
must be rrade within 15 'WOrking days of entering into 
the contract. Secondly, the Carrnission rray grant authorisation 
to give effect to a provision of a contract or arrangerrent 
entered into, or an understanding arrived at, before 
the carrrencerrent of the Act (section 59(2)(a)). This 
was the exception relied on in the F&P case. The EOCs 
that bound F&P and its franchised dealers ~re contained 
in contracts that pre-dated the cornrencerrent of the 
Carrnerce Act on 1 May 1986. 
One further point to note about the scherre of the Act 
is that the Carrrerce Carmission and the High Court 
(Administrative Division) have corrplerrentary roles. 
The forrrer has jurisdiction to consider the public benefit 
and grant authorisations, while the latter has jurisdiction 
to decide whether a contravention of the Act has occurred. 
12. 
3. ELEMENTS OF SECTION 27(2) 
The elerrents of section 27(2) are as follows: 
- that a person is involved; 
that the person wants to give effect to a provision 
of a contract, arrangerrent or understanding; 
- that the contract, arrangerrent or understanding 
rrust have the purpose or 
has or is likely to have the effect 
- of substantially lessening corrpetition 
- in a mrrket. 
For carpleteness, the following section contains a brief 
synopsis of the relevant points fran the case law on 
the interpretation of section 27. 
"Person" is defined in section 2 to include an association 
of persons whether incorporated or not. 
To decide whether or not a contract exists bet~en the 
parties one refers to the ordinary rules of contract, 
ie, the question is whether one party has rrade an offer, 
which the other party has accepted, and whether consideration 
has been given. The rreaning of the "'-Drds "arrangerrent 
or agreerrent" in the New Zealand Trade Practices Act 
1958 was considered in Re Wellington Fencing Materials 
Association. The Trade Practices Appeal Authority stated: 
"The addition of the word 'arrangerrent' is clearly 
intended to convey sorrething nore than would be 
conveyed by the tenn 'agreerrent' . It rray be 
suggested, perhaps, that the -word 'arrangerrent' 
is intended rrerely to include an understanding between 
t\o.D or nore persons intended to be observed by the 
parties thereto but not intended t~4create obligations 
enforceable by legal proceedings." 
The question of what constituted an arrangerrent also 
arose in British Basic 
d . t 15 Tra ing Agreerren s . 
purportedly adopted by 
was: 
Slag Ltd v Registrar of Restrictive 
In the lower court Cross J's test, 
Diplock LJ in the Court of Appeal, 
13. 
" ... all that is required to constitute an arrangement 
not enforceable in law is that the parties to it 
shall have coomunicated with one another in some 
way, and that as a result of the comnunication each 
has intentionally aroused in the ot~6r an expectation that he will act in a certain way. " 
Diplock LJ ~nt on to say: 
" .•. it is sufficient to constitute an arrangement 
between A and B if 
(1) A makes a representation as to his future conduct 
with the expectation and intention that such 
conduct on his part will operate as an inducement 
to B to act in a particular way, 
(2) such representation is corrrnunicated to B, who 
has knowledge that A so expected and intended, 
and 
(3) such representation or A's conduct in fulfilment 
of it operates as an inducerrent, whether arrong 
other inducerrentf7or not, to B to act in that particular way." 
The irrportant points to take fran the above two passages 
are that an arrangement requires: 
- corrmunication by at least one of the parties to the 
other about the corrmunicator's future conduct: 
- raising an expectation in the mind of the other party 
that the coomunicator expects his or her conduct to 
induce the other party to act in a particular way: 
and 
- action by the other party, at least one of the reasons 
for the action being the carmunication or the comnunicator 
fulfilling his or rer representation. 
In rrany cases it will be difficult to show that an expectation 
rad been raised in the corrmunicator's mind that the other 
party would act in a certain way. For the purpose of 
finding an arrangement the Court in TPC v Nicholas Enterprises 
Pty Ltd & Ors18 said that the courts m3.Y infer such an 
expectation fran circumstantial evidence, eg, if all 
the parties subsequently take parallel action. H~ver, 
it is open to a party to rebut any such inference by 
bringing evidence that ¼Duld support another interpretation 
of the facts, eg, that the action was required for comrercial 
reasons. 
14. 
Whether "purpose" in section 27 should be read objectively 
or subjectively has been considered by the courts in 
a nurrber of cases. Barker Jin ARA v Mutual Rental Cars
19 , 
following Smithers Jin Dandy Power Equiprrent Pty Ltd 
v Mercury Marine Ltd
2
0, found that section 2( 5) ( a) 
conterrplated an objective test. That section reads: 
"A provision of a contract, arrangerrent or understanding 
••• shall be deerred to have had, or to have, a 
particular purpose if -
(i) The provision was or is included in the 
contract, arrangerrent or understanding • . . for that 
purpose or purposes that included or include that 
purpose; and 
(ii) That purpose was or is a substantial purpose." 
The High Ca..n:t in Apple Fields Ltd v The New Zealand Apple 
21 
& Pear Marketing Board stated that the law on whether 
purpose is to be assessed on an objective or subjective 
basis is unclear. It noted that, after considering the 
authorities relied on by Barker J in ARA, Toohey J in 
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) 
& Ors22 preferred the subjective test. Il1Tru 'Itre Ltd & Q:s 
V Festival fe.:Dms let.ail M:lrl<;et.irg Lta2
3 
t.re Cart of lg::a:l1_ did rot 
h:r,.,e to d:al with tlE q..EStim ta:a Fe it relia:1 m tlE "effu::t" 
limb. H~ever, it noted that the rreaning of purpose 
"calls for careful analysis of the statutory scherre and 
setting1124 • 
Both the rrajority of the Carrrerce Coomission and the 
High Court in the F&P cases supported an objective rreaning: 
because: 
"authorisation proceedings are rrore clearly concerned 
with the perceived effects of the practice rather 
than what was act~lly in the minds of the parties 
to the practice" . 
All that can be said at this stage about whether purpose 
has an objective or a subjective rreaning is that the 
~ight of judicial opinion in the New Zealand High Court 
favours an objective rreaning. However, until the Court 
15. 
of Appeal considers the question, t"le law on this question 
cannot be considered to be settled. 
"Substantially lessening coo-petition in a rrarket" is 
discussed in Part 5.4 of this paper. 
16. 
4. METHorou::x;y IN ASSESSING WHETHER 'ID GRANT AN 
AUTHORISATION 
In its decisions the Cormerce Comnission has atterrpted 
to set out principles to be applied and the m::>de of analysis 
to be used in order to 
26 of the Cormerce Act. 
Ltd& Ors ( "Whakatu" / 7 
give form to the general v.Drds 
Thus , in Re Weddel Crown Corp 
it set out the rrethodology to 
be applied in assessing whether or not to grant an 
authorisation. Those principles were applied by the 
Comnission to the exclusive dealing situation in the 
F&P case. This approach was -endorsed by the High Court 
- 28 
on appeal. 
Since then, the Camerce Arrendrrent Act 1990 (the relevant 
parts of which becarre effective on 1 July 1990) has made 
changes in this area. In order to understand the effect 
of the changes it is necessary to examine what the previous 
law was. 
Previously, the Comnission's inquiry involved three steps: 
1 ) It had to decide whether in accordance with section 58 
it had jurisdiction over the rratter, ie, wrether 
the Comnission believed the practice substantially 
lessened coopetition within the rreaning of section 
27. (That is sorretirres referred to as the jurisdiction 
issue. ) If the Comnission decided it did not have 
jurisdiction, that was the end of the rratter. If 
it did have jurisdiction -
2) There was a presunption of a net lessening of 
carpetition. However, it was still necessary to 
quantify the degree of lessening of crnpetition 
(detrirrent) to be weighed against the public benefit. 
3) Under section 61(6) the Coomission was required to 
weigh up the benefits and detrirrents arising from 
the practice and if public bemfits outweighed 
detrirrents authorisation would be granted. 
17. 
The relevant sections provided: 
11 58. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part 
of this Act, the Carrnission ffi3.Y, upon application 
by or on behalf of any person, grant an authorisation 
for that person -
(a) To enter into a contract or arrangerrent, or 
arrive at an understanding, to which section 
27 of this Act applies: 
(b) To give effect to a provision of a contract 
or arrangerrent or understanding to which 
section 27 of this Act applies 11 • • 
"61. 
(6) The Carrnission shall not make a determination 
granting an authorisation under section 58(l)(a) 
to (d) of this Act unless it is satisfied that -
(a) The entering into of the contract or 
ai::rangerrent or the arriving at the understanding; 
or 
(b) The giving effect to the provision of the 
contract, arrangerrent or understanding; 
as the case ffi3.Y be, to which the application relates, 
will in all the circurIBtances result, or be likely 
to result, in a benefit to the public which ...ould 
ou~igh the lessening in crnpetition that would 
result, or ...ould be likely to result or is deerred 
to result there from. 11 
In the first case that arose under section 27, Whakatu, 
it was submitted that once an application for authorisation 
of a trade practice under section 58 had been ffi3.de, the 
Carrnission should rrove to consider the public benefit 
question under section 61(6). The opposing view was 
that before the Comnission could consider whether an 
authorisation should be granted it had to have concluded 
that the trade practice carre within section 27. 
In support of the first view it was argued that the 1986 
Act had rermved the ability for the Carrnission to grant 
a clearance for trade practices. If the Carrnission was 
required to decide whether a case did or did not fall 
within the terms of section 27, it would be tantarrount 
to giving a clearance. An alternative argurrent was that 
the applicant had conceded jurisdiction by applying for 
an authorisation. 
18. 
'The Coomission found in favour of the second view. It 
relied in particular on the actual wording of the Act. 
Section 58(l)(b) provided that the Coomission may grant 
an authorisation "To enter into a contract, etc, to 
which section 27 of this Act applies" (emphasis added). 
'The Coomission noted that section 58 gives it the power 
to grant authorisations and that sections 61(6) and (7), 
which set out the criteria to be satisfied before an 
authorisation may be granted, specifically refer back 
to that section. 
'The Coomission accepted that it had no power to give 
a clearance. It did not consider thaat the procedure 
in which a practice had to be shown to fall within section 27 
before authorisation could be considered, was a clearance. 
'That is because the Coomission's decision does not bind 
any Court called upon to consider whether a contravention 
of section 27 has occurred. 
In Re Chemists' Guild of New Zealand Ltd
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the Coomission 
said that an application for authorisation should not 
of itself create an adverse inference about whether the 
practice substantially lessened corrpetition. 
In deciding that in order for it to have jurisdiction 
the practice nust contravene section 27 the Carrrerce 
Coomission departed fran the practice of its counterpart, 
the Australian Trade Practices Coomission. Section 88(l)(a) 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the equivalent of section 
58(l)(a) of the Carrrerce Act 1986) states: 
" .•• the Coomission may, upon application by or 
on behalf of a corporation, grant an authorisation to 
the corporation -
(a) to make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at 
an understanding, where a provision of the proposed 
contract, arrangerrent or understanding would be, 
or might be, an exclusionary provision or ¼Ould 
have the purpose, or ¼Ould have or might have the 
effect, of substantially lessening coopetition 
within the rreaning of section 45 [equivalent to 
section 27 of the Carrrerce Act]". (Errphasis added) 
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In its decision in Application of Shell Co of Australia 
& Neptune Oil Co Pty Ltd the Trade Practices Comnission 
said: 
"The Carrnission thus does not see its duty as being 
to determine whether, in fact section 45 ..• has 
been breached. This is a rratter that only a court 
can decide. The Comnission's function is to apply 
to the case the test laid d~tf in section 90(5) 
[the public benefit test]." 
In Whakatu the Ccmrerce Carrnission ccmrented that the 
anission of the words "or might be" fran section 58(1) 
of the Ccmrerce Act seerred quite pointed because otherwise 
the section followed quite closely the wording of section 
88 of the Trade Practices Act. The Carrnission viewed 
th t t . . d . . 31 a as suppor ing its ec1s1on. 
After the Camerce Act had been in force for 2 years 
the Departrrent of Trade and Industry (the coo-petition 
functions of -which are now incorporated in the Ministry 
of Ccmrerce) conducted a review of the Act in light of 
developrrents and experience since its inplerrentation. 
On the jurisdiction issue it found that the Comnission's 
approach had resulted in a blurring of the respective 
responsibilities of the Comnission and the High Court. 
As a result of the Comnission's approach a problem arose. 
If the Carrnission could not consider the issue of public 
benefit unless a practice contravened the Act, a practice 
that the Comnission did not think contravened the Act 
could not be authorised. If circurrstances in the rrarket 
changed and the practice had a rrore serious effect on 
coopetition, that would leave the person at risk fran 
a private action. Although the public benefit might 
outweigh the detrirrent arising fran the practice, warranting 
the grant of an authorisation, the Court has no power 
under the Act to consider public benefit argurrents.
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To clarify the situation the Ccmrerce Arrendrrent Act 1990 
repealed the old section 58 and substituted a new section 58, 
20. 
the relevant parts of which read: 
"58. (1) A person who wishes to enter into a 
contract or arrangerrent, or arrive at an understanding, 
to which that person considers section 27 of this 
Act would apply, or might apply, rray apply to the 
Coomission for an authorisation to do so and the 
Coomission rray grant an authorisation for that person 
to enter into the contract or arrangerrent, or arrive 
at the understanding. 
(2) A person who wishes to give effect to a 
provision of a contract or arrangerrent or understanding 
to which that person considers section 27 of this 
Act would apply, or might apply, rray apply to the 
Coomission for an authorisation to do so, and the 
Carmission rray grant an authorisation for that person 
to give effect to the provision of the contract 
or arrangerrent or understanding." (Fnphasis added) 
The effect of the new section will be that when a person 
IT'akes application to the Carmission for authorisation, 
the Carmission will assure that the practice substantially 
lessens corrpetition and proceed irnrediately to assess 
the degree of lessening of coopetition and apply the 
public benefit test. If sufficient public benefits exist 
the practice will be authorised. 
Only when a case goes to the High Court alleging contravention 
of section 27 will the question of whether the practice 
actually substantially lessens coopetition be decided. 
That is not to say that the argurrents relevant to this 
question will not be before the Coomission. As will 
be discussed in Part 11 of this paper, the Coomission' s 
decision on the public benefit test depends on a 
consideration of these argurrents. 
21. 
5. LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPROPRIATE TO THE FISHER & PAYKEL 
CASE 
In setting out the legal principles appropriate to the 
F&P case the High Court quoted from textbooks and cases 
of various jurisdictions. It noted that apart from 
differences in errphasis there was little argurrent over 
relevant legal principles, apart from over the extent 
to which United States authority should be followed.
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5.1 MARKET 
'Ihe first question to ask is, what is the relevant rrarket? 
Market is defined in section 3(1A) as: 
"a rrarket in New Zealand for goods or services as 
~11 as other goods or services that, as a rratter 
of fact and ccmrercial comron sense, are substitutable 
for them". 
'Ihe determination of the rrarket will play an irrportant 
part in the case, because if the rrarket is cast too widely 
it will be rrore difficult to show a substantial lessening 
of carpetition. All the parties in the F&P case agreed 
that the relevant rrarket was the rrarket for the retail 
distribution of whitegoods in New Zealand. 
5.2 CCMPETITION 
Coopetition is defined in section 3(1) to rrean "workable 
or effective carpetition". The High Court found the 
definition of "....x:>rkable corrpetition" in Heydon' s Trade 
Practice Law to be acceptable: 
"Workable coopetition rreans a rrarket frarrework in 
which the presence of other participants (or the 
existence of potential new entrants) is sufficient 
to ensure that each participant is constrained to 
act efficiently and in its planning to take account 
of those other participants or likely entrants as 
unknown quantities. To that end there rrust be an 
opportunity for each participant or new entrant 
to achieve an equal footing with the efficient 
participants in the rrarket by having equivalent 
access to the rreans of entry, sources of supply, 
outlets for product, inforrration, expertise and 
finance. This is not to say that particular instances 
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of the iterrs on that list rrust be available to all. 
That \\'Ould be irrpossible. For exanple, a particular 
custorrer is not at any one tirre freely available 
to all suppliers. ¼brkable corrpetition exists when 
there is an opportunity for sufficient influences 
to exist in any rrarket, which rrust be taken into 
account by each participant and which constrain 
its behaviour." 
"Effective crnpetition" was discussed in the Queensland 
Co-operative Milling Association case
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as follows: 
"Corrpetition is a process rather than a situation. 
Nevertheless, whether firrrs corrpete is very much 
a rratter of the structure of the rrarkets in which 
they operate. The elerrents of rrarket structure 
which we would stress as needing to be scanned in 
any case are these: 
(1) the nurrber and size distribution of independent 
sellers, especially the degree of rrarket concentration; 
(2) the height of barriers to entry, ie, the ease 
with which new firrrs rray enter and secure a viable 
rrarket; 
( 3) the extent to which the products of the industry 
are characterised by extrerre product differentiation 
and sales prorrotion; 
(4) the character of "vertical relationships" with 
custorrers and with suppliers and the extent of vertical 
integration; and 
(5) the nature of any forrral, stable and fundarrental 
arrangerrents bet¼een firrrs which restrict their 
ability to function as independent entities. 
Of all these elerrents of rrarket structure, no doubt 
the rrost irrportant is (2), the condition of entry. 
For it is the ease with which finns rray enter which 
establishes the possibilities of rrarket concentration 
over tirre; and it is the threat of entry of a new 
firm or a new plant into a rrarket which operates 
as the ultirrate regulator of crnpetitive conduct." 
The High Court in the F&P case quoted extensively from 
the decision in a recent arbitration conducted under 
the aegis of the International Centre for Settlerrent 
of Investrrent Disputes, Mobil Oil v Her Majesty in right 
of New Zealand36 • New Zealand law was being interpreted, 
and, in particular, the application of section 27 of 
the Camerce Act to the facts before the tribunal. The 
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arbitral tribunal was held in high regard by the Court 
because of the distinguished persons who carprised it. 
That tribunal regarded the term "corrpetition" as irrporting 
relativities "to be assessed by reference to the irll)act 
of the practice upon the functioning of the relevant 
rrarket" . 
5.3 SUBSTANI'IAL 
Substantial is defined in section 2 to rrean "real or 
of substance". This definition was probably included 
in the Act to signal that it was appropriate to use 
Australian precedents in interpreting the term. It was 
the Full Federal Court of Australia in Tillmann's Butcheries 
Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Errployees' Union 
& Ors that interpreted the term as rreaning "real or of 
substance": 
"In the context of S.450(1) of the Act, the v.Drd 
'substantial' is used in a relative sense in that, 
regardless of whether it rreans large or weighty 
on the one hand or real or of substance as distinct 
from epherreral or naninal on the other, it would 
be necessary to know sorrething of the nature and 
scope of the relevant business before one would 
say that particular actual or potential loss or dam:l.ge 
was substantial. As at present advised, I incline 
to the view that the phrase, substantial loss or 
d.arrage, in S.450(1) includes loss or d.arrage that 
is, in the circumstances, real39r of substance and 
not insubstantial or nominal." 
The High Court in the F&P case agreed with this formulation.
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The tribunal in the Mobil arbitration said that "substantially" 
should be judged in corrpetition terms. The effect of 
this is that sare rratters have rmre inportance than others. 
Specifically, the height of barriers to entry is the 
. 39 
rmst mportant elerrent of rrarket structure. 
5.4 SUBSTANI'IALLY LESSENING CCMPETITION 
In its decision on the Mobil arbitration the tribunal 
quoted a passage from the judgrrent of the Full Federal 
40 
Court of Australia in D:mdy Power , which has been 
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followed in all New Zealand cases in section 27: 
"To apply the concept of substantially lessening 
crnpetition in a rrarket, it is necessary to assess 
the nature and extent of the rrarket, the probable 
nature and extent of corrpetition which would exist 
therein but for the conduct in question, the way 
1he rrarket operates and the nature and extent of 
the conterrplated lessening. To my mind one must 
look at the relevant significant portion of the 
rrarket, ask oneself row and to what extent there 
would have been cx:npetition therein but for the 
conduct, assess what is left and determine whether 
what has been lost in relation to what would have 
been, is seen to be a substantial lessening of crnpet-
ition. I prefer not to substitute other adverbs 
for 'substantially'. 'Substantially' is a word 
the rreaning of which in the circurIBtances in which 
it is applied rrust, to sorre extent, be of uncertain 
incidence and a rratter of judgrrent. There is no precise 
scale by which to rreasure what is substantial. 
I think . . . the word is used in a sense irrporting 
a greater rather than a less degree of lessening. 
Accordingly in my opinion corrpetition in a rrarket 
is substantially lessened if the extent of coopetition 
in the rrarket whch has been lost, is seen by those 
coopetent to judge to be a substantial lessening 
of crnpetition. Has crnpetitive trading in the 
rrarket been substantially interfered with? It is 
then that the public as such will suffer • • • Although 
the ¼Drds 'substantially lessened in a rrerket' refer 
generally to a rrerket, it is the degree to which 
carpetition has been lessened which is critical, 
not the proportion of that lessening to the whole 
of the coopetitim which exists in the total mrrket. 
Thus a lessening in a significant section of the 
rrerket, if a substantial lessening of otherwise 
active crnpetition rray, according to circurIBtances, 
be a substantial lessening of corrpetition in a rrarket." 
Fran that passage the tribunal drew three points: 
1) The desirability of interpreting the phrase "substantially 
lessening cmpetition" as a whole; 
2) The rranner in which relativity is to be approached; 
and 
3) The rranner in which causality is to be assessed: 
it is necessary to assess the cmpetitive functioning 
of a relevant rrarket, with and without the disputed 
practice. 
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6. HIQ-I COURT'S APPROACH 'IO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
"SUBSTANTIALLY LESSENING CCMPETITION" 
The test used by the Carrrerce Cornnission in the F&P case 
to assist it in deciding whether there had been a substantial 
lessening of coopetition in a rrarket in tenns of section 27 
was based on that propounded in USA Guidelines for Non-
Price Vertical Restraints (VRGs). Counsel for F&P argued 
that, while the principles in Whakatu provide a sound 
starting point for analysing restrictive trade practices, 
exclusive dealing must be analysed within the appropriate 
economic frarrework. Since the Comnission had adopted 
guidelines in respect to vertical integration for rrergers 
and takeovers, he suggested it ¼Duld also be appropriate 
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to adopt guidelines in this area. This the Comnission 
did. 
On appeal to the High Court the guidelines the Coornission 
had formulated based on the VRGs -were rejected. The 
Court stated that the VRGs had not found universal approval 
in the USA. It sounded a note of caution about accepting 
guidelines that have no foundation in the f'ew Zealand 
statute. "The Comnission' s function" , it stated, "is 
to assess the application of section 27 to every case 
that cares before it. 
1142 
The High Court noted that the ¼Drds "substantially 
lessening corrpetition in a rrarket" had been subject to 
much judicial interpretation, both in f'ew Zealand since 
the Camerce Act was introduced and in other jurisdictions 
with similar words.
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As -well as in the Cormerce Act, 
the sarre phrase (or an equivalent phrase) appears in 
the: 
- US Clayton Act 1914 (section 3); 
- Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (section 47 and 
others); 
- Canadian Carpetition Act 1985 (section 77). 
The Court felt that lengthy guidelines -were unnecessary 
especially in respect of exclusive dealing, because if 
26. 
there were not already sufficient precedents of the Comnission 
and the Courts, sufficient would develop. In any case 
the Comnission v--Duld usually have economic evidence before 
it to help it arrive at its decision.
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As the Canadian Coopetition Act is of recent origin, 
few cases have been decided under it. Therefore, it 
is the approach of the US and the Australian Courts in 
interpreting the words "substantially lessening coopetition" 
that will be of rrost use for our purposes. 
27. 
7. UNITED STATES CASE I.AW 
Section 3 of the US Clayton Act 1914 states: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
cormerce, in the course of such comrerce, to lease 
or ITBke a sale or contract for sale of goods 
for use, consurption, or resale within the United 
States ••. on the a:n:litim, agreerrent, or understanding 
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use 
or deal in the goods ..• of a cmpetitor or corrpetitors 
of the ••. seller, 'Where the effect of such lease, 
sale or contract for sale on such condition, agreerrent, 
or understanding rray be to substantially lessen 
corrpetition or tend to create a rronopoly in any 
line of connerce. " 
A substantial body of case law dealing with vertical 
restraints, including exclusive dealing, has developed 
around this section in the US. 
At several places in its judgment the High Court in the 
F&P case emphasised that developrrents in US anti-trust 
law and econanics should be treated cautiously and not 
adopted uncritically, because of the different statutory 
regirres and vast differences in the rrarkets. H~ver, 
it also quoted a passage from the decision in the Mobil 
arbitration: 
"While the language and structure of the Australian 
and New Zealand Acts are very similar, though certainly 
not identical,there is a less close relationship 
between New Zealand and US law. Nevertheless we 
recognise that Arrerican anti-trust cases rray suggest 
lines of analysis of the facts that rray well be 
pertinent in app4~cation of New Zealand provisions." 
(Eirphasis added) 
That appears to be how the High Court used US case law -
to inform its analysis. 
7.1 APPROAOI OF US COURTS 'IO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
"SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN CC11PETITION" 
In Standard Oil Co v us46 the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit laid down a test that has becorre known 
as the "quantitative substantiality" test. It states: 
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"that the qualifying clause [the corrpetition test] 
of section 3 [of the Clayton Act 1914) is satisfied 
by proof that corrpetition has been foreclosed in 
a substantial share of the line of corrrrerce affected". 
The only inquiry is as to the actual percentage of the 
market that has been foreclosed to corrpetition. r-b rrore 
need be said about this test because the High Court in 
the F&P case affi.rrred the Coomission's decision that 
such a test was inappropriate in New Zealand given the 
vast differences in markets, both in terms of size and 
th 
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o er cira..nnstances. 
The landmark case on exclusive dealing that set out the 
tests to be applied in deciding whether a substantial 
lessening of corrpetition in a market had occurred was 
Tarrpa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co et al 
48 • The plaintiff, 
an electricity generating corrpany, sought a declaratory 
judgrrent that the defendant had wrongfully repudiated 
a contract to provide the plaintiff with all its coal 
requirerrents for the next 20 years. At first instance 
the Court declared that the contract violated section 3 
of the Clayton Act. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deviated 
from the rule it had established in Standard Oil
49 
and 
erected criteria whic_h dem:3.I1d close scrutiny of the 
economic ramifications of an EDA in orcler to detennine 
the probable anti-corrpet~tive effects of the practice. 
The Court set out the following tests: 
"First , the line of comrerce, ie, the type of goods 
wares or rrerchandise, etc, involved must be detennined, 
where it is in controversy, on the basis of the 
facts peculiar to the case. Second, the area of 
effective corrpetition in the known line of comrerce 
rrust be charted by careful selection of the market 
area in which the seller operates, and to which 
the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies. 
Thircl, and last, the corrpetition foreclosed by the 
contract must be found to constitute a substantial 
29. 
share of the relevant rrarket. That is to say, the 
opportunities for other traders to enter into or 
rerrain in that rrarket must be significantly limited 
as was pointed out in Standard Oil Co v US, supra. 
To detennine substantiality in a given case, it 
is necessary to -weigh the probable effect of the 
contract on the relevant area of effective corrpetition, 
taking into account the relative strength of the 
parties, the proportionate volurre of carrrerce involved 
in respect to the total volurre of comrerce in the 
relevant rrarket area, and the probable i.rrrrediate 
and future effects 'which pre-errption of that share 
of the ~5et might have on effective corrpetition 
therein." 
This test is a::mronly referred to as the "qualitative 
substantiality" test. It is applied 'where the seller 
is not dominant in the rrarket and (a) the percentage 
of rrarket foreclosure is not substantial: or (b) the 
seller or buyer needs the challenged practices to continue 
operating his or her business. 
later Courts have said that the plaintiff must show that 
other factors present in the rrarket exacerbate the 
detrinental effect of the challenged restraints
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, ie, 
exclusive dealing alone cannot be anti-corrpetitive. 
To evaluate the restraints and their probable effects 
in the rrarket the courts have considered a range of economic 
factors including: 
( 1) the extent to 'which corrpetition is foreclosed in
 
the relevant rrarket: 
( 2) the dominance of the seller in its industry; 
( 3) the relative strengths of the parties: 
( 4) the ease with 'which new outlets can be dev
eloped; 
( 5) the sales structure of the industry: 
( 6) the extent to 'which corrpetition has flourished 
despite the use of the exclusive contracts: and 
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( 7) the duration for wili:h the arrangements are to run. 
The tests in the earlier cases -were reaffinred and further 
developed by the US Suprerre Court in Continental Television 
30. 
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Inc v GI'E Sylvania Inc . In that case the Court overruled 
its decision in US v Arnold, Swinn & co
54 that certain 
vertical restrictions were illegal per se, ie, illegal 
regardless of how reasonable the restraint was.
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Court held that the legality of vertical trade restrictions 
should be determined in accordance with the rule of reason. 
There is sare debate over what constitutes a rule of 
reason analysis. Broadly, it rreans that only restraints 
that unreasonably affect corrpetition are held to be illegal. 
For exarrple, even a significant restraint would not be 
illegal if it could be shown to have features that outweigh 
the lessening of canpetition. The formulation of the 
rule courts often rely on is from Justice Brandeis' opinion 
in Chicago Board of Trade v US: 
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
irrposed is such as rrerely regulates and pemaps 
thereby prorrotes corrpetition or whether it is such 
as rray suppress or even destroy corrpetition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily 
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which 
the restraint is applied: its condition before and 
after the restraint was irrposed: the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The 
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, 
the reason for adopting the particular rerredy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all 
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention 
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation 
or the reverse: but because knowledge of intent 
nay help the ~wt to interpret facts and to predict 
conseqoonces." 
Posner does not find this a helpful formulation: 
"To be told to look to the history, circumstances, 
purpose and effects of a challenged restriction 
is not to be provided with usable criteria of illeg-
ality. If Justice Brandeis had said that the test 
was whether the restriction was on balance pro-
or anti-canpetitive, this would at least have 
excluded criteria unrelated to corrpetitiveness. 
Perhaps that is the rreaning of the first sentence 
quoted above. Yet arguably coopetition should not 
be the exclusive determinant of an unreasonable 
retraint of trade. This formulation would prohibit 
those restraints that, while red~9ing corrpetition, 
on balance increase efficiency." 
31. 
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Beltone Electronics Corp , a decision of the Federal 
Trade Corrmission, is the rrost significant recent decision 
on exclusive dealing in the United States. It is discussed 
by R M Steur in his article "Exclusive dealing in 
distribution": 
"On the basis of its historical survey [of prior 
authorities on exclusive dealing], the Corrmission 
rejected foreclosure as the only pertinent criterion. 
It stated that the foreclosure standards 'are not 
well settled' , and that even if they were, under 
the newer Sylvania standard foreclosure rrust be 
considered as 'only one of several variables to 
be weighed'. [Footnote omitted] The Corrmission 
noted that under Sylvania there rrust be close 
examination of the 'dynamics' of the market: 'More 
specifically, a proper analysis of exclusive 
dealing arrangerrents should take into account market 
definition, the arrount of foreclosure in the relevant 
markets, the duration of the contracts, the extent 
to v.tridl entry is deterred, and the reasonable 59 
justifications, if any, for the exclusivity.'" 
7.2 APPLICABILITY OF US APPROACH 'ID NZ LAW 
In any atterrpt to discover how the law of another country 
might help in the interpretation of one's own law, it 
is necessary to be aware of any differences between the 
two, and to recognise what effect those differences might 
have. 
US law contains no equivalent of the authorisation procedure 
provided by the Ccmrerce Act. Therefore, a person will 
not know conclusively whether a practice substantially 
lessens corrpetition until an action is brought against 
them and the -court has the opportunity to decide the 
rratter. A decision that the practice is anti-conpetitive 
will result in penalties being irrposed on the person. 
By contrast, in an authorisation application under NZ 
law, even if the Ccmnission believes the practice 
substantially lessens coopetition, the person has a chance 
in the public benefit test to prove that the benefits 
flowing from the practice outweigh the lessening of 
coopetition, so the practice should not be prohibited. 
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It rray be that because under US law there is only one 
chance to prove that the practice is not illegal, and 
the penalties are severe if the practice is found to 
be anti-coopetitive, the US test of substantially lessening 
corrpetition rray require consideration of rratters that 
would not fit within the NZ test. An exarrple of that 
'WOuld be public benefits arising from the practice. 
A second difference arises from the 'WOrding of the Acts. 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act refers to "the effect of 
such ••. sale etc on such condition, agrearent or 
understanding rray be to substantially lessen coopetition". 
Section 27 of the Carrrerce Act refers to "a provision 
that ••• has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening coopetition". It is arguable 
that this difference in wording is not significant 
60 
because in Standard Fashion v Magrane-Houston Co , an 
exclusive dealing case under section 3, the Court 
interpreted "rray" to mean "probable". Likewise in the 
New Zealand case of Air New Zealand v Comrerce Coomission
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the High Court equated "likely" with "probable" rather 
than "possible". 
Turning them to consider the US test of substantially 
lessening corrpetition in the context of exclusive dealing. 
It appears that exclusive dealing alone cannot be anti-
corrpetitive. There must be other factors in the rrarket, 
which, carbined with the practice, increase its anti-
coopetitive effects. The inportant factor from Tarrpa 
Electric62 is the extent to which the ability of other 
traders to enter into or rerrain in the rrarket is limited. 
To assist them in evaluating the effect of the restraint 
in the rrarket the courts have in recent cases used econanic 
evidence. Arrong the factors that have been considered 
is the extent to which coopetition is foreclosed in the 
relevant rrarket. The test of that from Tanpa Electric 
includes, arrong other things, taking into account "the 
proportionate volume of comrerce involved in respect 
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to the total volurre of comrerce in the relevant market 
area". 
The significance of that for our purposes is that that 
fonnulation as a rreasure of the extent to which corrpetition 
in a market has been affected as a result of the practice, 
was specifically rejected by the Full Federal Court of 
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Australia in Dandy Po~r when it said: 
"Although the -words 'substantially lessened in a 
market' refer generally to a rrarket, it is the degree 
to which coopetition has been lessened which is 
critical, not the proportion of that lessening to 
the whole of the coopetition which exists in the 
total market." (E.rrphasis added) 
New Zealand courts have followed Dandy Po~r. 
It should be noted in respect of the second economic 
factor(listed on page 29) the courts have taken into 
account, dominance is not an issue under section 27 of 
the Comrerce Act. 
One further point should be rrade about the US authority. 
The High Court in the F&P case comrented -
'that earlier US decisions appeared to concentrate 
on anti-coopetitive rrotives wi5~out adequately 
considering efficiency gains". 
The final t-wo sentences in the quote from Justice 
Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade (quoted on 
page 30) indicate a concern with rrotive in deciding 
whether a practice is anti-corrpetitive. By contrast, 
the following quote from Posner illustrates the recent 
trend towards considering efficiency gains. The idea 
that corrpetitiveness should not be the only determinant 
of the desirability of a vertical restraint, that the 
efficiency increasing aspects of the restraint should 
also be inportant, derives from the thinking of the Chicago 
School of Economic Theory. Their argurrent is that economic 
efficiency is the goal of anti-trust law.
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Motive is 
not irrportant in the NZ analysis of the anti-coopetitive 
effects of a practice, but efficiency gains are. 
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As will be evident when the NZ test of substantially 
lessening CorqJetition is discussed in Part 10 of this 
paper, the High Court in F&P adopted a frarrework for 
the analyis of exclusive dealing that is very similar 
to the one evolved by the US courts. 
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8. AUSTRALIAN CASE LAW 
Although the Australian Trade Practices Act has a specific 
section covering exclusive dealing (section 47), the 
High Court in the F&P case noted that that did not affect 
the ITB.tters to be considered in a section 27 assessrrent.
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Two Australian decisions were discussed by the High Court: 
Re Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd
67 and Outboard Marine 
Australian Pty Ltd v Hecar Investrrents No. 6 Pty Ltd
68 . 
In the Ford case Ford r-btor Co of Australia Ltd and Ford 
Sales Co of Australia Ltd were appealing against determinations 
of the Federal Trade Ccmnission refusing to authorise 
Ford's ITB.ndatory solo franchising provision contained 
in an agreerrent with its dealers. Under that agreerrent 
dealers were required to sell only Ford rrotor vehicles, 
parts and accessories. On appeal the Trade Practices 
Tribunal upheld the determination of the Comnission because 
it found that Ford had failed to establish that the benefit 
to the public resulting from the restrictive provision 
outweighed the detrirrent to the public arising from the 
lessening of crnpetition. 
The High Court in the F&P case distinguished the Ford 
case on its fact: 
(a) site ties applied to aJrros t half the Ford outlets, 
so dealers were not free to switch to other franchisers 
if they wanted to; 
(b) Govemrrent policy created barriers to entry into 
the market by controlling the nurmer of ITB.nufacturers 
and limiting irrports; 
( c) autorrobiles were a higher-cost camodity than whiteware 
so the cost of entering the dealership market was 
higher. 
The first two factors create barriers to entry, which, 
as will be explained in Part 10, in conjunction with 
certain other conditions in the market, ITB.Y result in 
there being a substantial lessening of corrpetition in 
the market. No barriers to entry were found by the High 
Court in the F&P case. 
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With respect,it seems unlikely that the third factor 
is a material distinction. Entry costs and entry barriers 
are discussed at Part 10.1.1. The definition used there 
refers to a barrier to entry involving a distortion in 
the allocation of resources. While the cost of the 
cormodity involved will affect the cost of entering the 
market, rather than having a distortionary effect on 
resource allocation, that will ensure that an optimal 
nurrber of dealers enter. Otherwise it would always be 
possible to argue that the cost of entering a market 
was a barrier because there are always lower priced 
cormodities around. 
In considering the persuasiveness of the Ford case 
the High Court in the F&P case said, if the Ford case 
ha.d been decided today it would likely not have been 
decided "in terms so forthrightly condemnatory of an 
EOC 1169 • That is because of the change in the economic 
thinking that has occurred over the past decade in respect 
of the corrpetitive effects of EDAs. 
Hecar is the leading Australian case on exclusive dealing. 
It is a judgrrent of the Full Federal Court of Australia. 
The facts are different fran those of the F&P case, 
but the High Court found two aspects of the case to be 
useful. Firstly, the Judges agreed that it would be 
unlikely in an otherwise corrpetitive market for sarething 
done to one carpetitor to result in a substantial 
lessening of corrpetition. In the words of Fitzgerald J: 
"It v.Duld, I think, be an unusual and exceptional 
case in which it could be shown that corrpetition 
in a generally corrpetitive market was or was likely 
to be substantially lessened by a refusal to supply 
one of a nurrber of corrpetitive retailers in the 
market with a product otherwise freely available 
and corrpetitively marketed. Further, where there 
is a market which is generally corrpetitive, it 
plainly does not follow that conduct which affects 
the balance of carpetition by advantaging or 
disadvantaging a particular dealer or dealers or 
a particular product or prcx:lucts necessarily lessens 
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the coopetition in the market. No doubt it rray 
be necessary in an appropriate case to have regard 
to the position in the market of the individual 
dealers or products affected to see if the interference 
with the balance between corrpetitors or carpeting 70 
products lessens corrpetition in the rrarket overall." 
The High Court in the F&P case considered that the Ford 
decision, with its eni:>hasis on the effect of the solo 
franchising provision on Ford, rather than on corrpetition 
in the rrarket, did not sit easily alongside the rrore 
recent Hecar decision. 
Secondly, the High Court found the reasoning of the Court 
in Hecar to be helpful. 
While in Ford and Hecar the Trade Practices Tribunal 
and the Australian High Court respectively engaged in 
an analysis of the rrarket, considered the state of 
corrpetition therein and the likely effect of the conduct 
on corrpetition in the rrarket, in neither case was econanic 
evidence used to help identify the pro- and anti-corrpetitive 
effects of the practice and to aid the decision whether 
the practice substantially lessened corrpetition in the 
market. There seems to be no reason why a future case 
could not involve such an econanic analysis and indeed 
the tenor of the judgrrents in Hecar suggest that the Courts 
'WOuld ~lcooe such an approach. 
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9. ECONCMIC EVIDENCE 
9 • 1 GENERP..L 
The minority Comrerce Corrrnission judgrrent in Re Fisher 
71 
& Paykel Ltd noted that the Comrerce Act contains no 
presurrption against vertical restraints, except resale 
. . t 72 th . 19 price main enance. Now at section of the Camerce 
Arrendrrent Act 1990 has made resale price maintenance 
an authorisable practice, the Act contains no presurrption 
against vertical restraints at all. In contrast, the 
Australian Trade Practices Act, upon which the Camerce 
Act is based, contains a section specifically concerned 
with exclusive dealing. With the rrove towards hanronisation 
of f\ew Zealand and Australian business law, 1he minority 
throught the fact tre drafters of the f\ew Zealand Act 
had decided not to follo.v the Australian approach reflected 
the considerable advances that had occurred in the 
international understanding of the econanic effects of 
exclusive dealing and other vertical practices.
73 The 
74 
High Court on appeal agreed with that assessffi=nt. 
In the v.Drds of the minority: 
"The acceptance or otherwise of [vertical] 
arrangeffi=nts will largely depend on their econanic 
effects and, rrore specifically 9§ their net effect 
on coopetition and efficiency." 
Although exclusive nealing is a vertical restraint its 
effect on corrpetition is not identical to those of other 
vertical restraints. Steur states: 
"Although certain similarities exist arrong the various 
vertical restraints, it is misleading to suggest 
that all vertical restraints have the Safi= pro-
carpetitive and anti-corrpetitive effects, and that 
all may be justified under a single economic 
equation. A proper analysis of exclusive dealing 
nust use a different approach from that used in 
analyzing territorial and other resale restraints, 
because exclusive dealing creates significantly 
different7
€ro-corrpetitive and anti-corrpetitive 
effects." 
He goes on to illustrate that a location clause, which 
is a resale restraint, requires the ....eighing of the 
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reduction of intrabrand coopetition (coopetition arrong 
manufacturers of the sarre generic product), against the 
stimulation of interbrand coopetition (coopetition arrong 
distributors of the product of a manufacturer). By 
requiring a distributor to resell from one location that 
prevents him or her from carpeting against other distributors 
of the sarre brand, and ensures that they carpete with 
distributors selling other brands. It also eliminates 
intrabrand free riding, ie, prevents a distributor fran 
taking advantage of prorrotional efforts undertaken by 
other distributors of the sarre brand without paying for 
them. 
Steur suggests that the proper analysis for exclusive 
dealing involves the weighing of the reduction of interbrand 
coopetition through foreclosure of distributors against 
the stimulation of interbrand coopetition encouraging 
more concentrated prorrotion of the brand by distributors 
and the elimination of the interbrand free rider effect. 
The significance of the different pro- and anti-coopetitive 
effects on the coopetition analysis undertaken in exclusive 
dealing cases will be discussed in Part 10. 
9. 2 PRO-CCl1PETITIVE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE IBALING 
There are argued to be four pro-coopetitive effects of 
exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing may: 
( 1) Encoura,3e rraximum prorrotional efforts by distributors; 
( 2 ) Reduce interbrand free riding; 
(3) Motivate distributors to undertake additional service-
related obligations; and 
(4) Reduce transaction costs. 
Firstly, it is argued that exclusive dealing is a rreans 
of obtaining maximum prorrotional efforts fran distributors, 
particularly when cooparison shopping items are involved. 
(These are items that tend to be expensive and long-lasting, 
so people are rrore inclined to ccrrpare brands and prices 
before purchasing.) If distributors stock only one 
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brand of products their sales efforts are not diluted. 
Also, their success is tied to the success of that brand.
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Multibrand stockists have the ability to prorrote products 
to custarers that provide the distributor with the best 
rrargin. For exarrple, Manufacturer A might invest in 
advertising and informing custarers of the benefits and 
features of its product. That cost will be reflected 
in the CX)St of product A to distributors. If Manufacturer 
B does not rrake such an investrrent, it can afford to 
lower the price at which it sells its product to distributors. 
Distributors are then in a position to use the information 
supplied in respect of Manufacturer A's product in selling 
Manufacturer B's product, thereby obtaining a higher 
rrergin. 
In e(X)nanic terms, taking advantage of sarething one 
has not paid for is called "free riding". Therefore, 
it is argued that the second pro-corrpetitive effect of 
exclusive dealing is that it reduces or eliminates interbrand 
free riding. (Exclusive dealing does not affect intrabrand 
free riding. ) 
Thirdly,it is argued that exclusive dealing encourages 
distributors to undertake additional obligations: 
"Exclusive dealing rray result in lower wholesale 
prices. Since suppliers rrust CX)rtpete for retailers 
through wholesale contracts which rray or rray not 
require exclusive dealing, the supplier will have 
to lower the wholesale price to induce the dealer 
to deal exclusively in the products of the supplier. 
Exclusive dealing which results in a higher rrergin 
between wholesale and resale price rray rrotivate 
dealers to expend rrore effort on prarotion, carry 
larger inventori,§, and provide rraintenance and 
repair service." 
This is a useful adjunct to the type of products usually 
sold by way of exclusive dealing. They tend to be 
cooparison shopping item:; for which reputation is 
inportant. 
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Fourthly, exclusive dealing rra.y reduce transaction costs. 
Manufacturers do not have to supply so many outlets and 
distributors can concentrate their sales and pramtional 
efforts. These cost savings rray result in lower retail 
prices allowing distributors to corrpete rrore effectively 
with rivals. Since the search for lower costs is an 
inportant aspect of the goal of profit rraximisation, 
it is argued that vertical restraints rrust foster 
efficiency. 
Marvel has argued that the only pro-conpetitive effect 
of exclusive dealing is that it creates a manufacturer's 
property right: 
"Manufacturers are assurred to wish to generate custorrers 
for their products through advertising and other 
prorrotional and brand-enhancerrent efforts rrost effic-
iently carried out at the manufacturer, rather than 
dealer, level. These custorrer-generating investrrents 
create business from which the dealer can readily 
profit, but there rerrains for the manufacturer the 
problem of charging its dealers for the additional 
custom. The sirrplest way to do so is ~ incorporating 
the charge for the manufacturer prorrotional effect 
into the wholesale price of the good. That is, 
the manufacturer offers the dealer a tie-in sale -
the physical product together with a set of likely 
custorrers for that product. A problem with this 
tie-in arises if the dealer is able to benefit from 
1he manufacturer's prorrotional effort while avoiding 
the pramtional charge. If, for exarrple, the 
additional custorrers are generated by advertising 
investrrents, the prorrotional charge is avoided if 
the dealer substitutes a similar, but unadvertised, 
brand for the advertised product. Exclusive dealing, 
by preventing this sort of substitution, provides 
the manufacturer with a ij5operty right to his 
prorrotional investrrent." 
He argues that exclusive dealing is not an efficient 
rreans of praroting increases in dealer services. In 
order to arrive at this conclusion, oowever, he assurres 
that exclusive dealers rra.ke fewer sales, resulting in 
lower rrargins, so the supplier has to reduce wholesale 
prices in order to conpensate dealers. The effect of 
this is a higher cost per unit of dealer services. 
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Against this Steur has argued that the profits of exclusive 
dealers will not necessarily be lower because their 
prorrotional efforts will not be diluted arrong a nurrber 
of brands, so total sales might be greater.
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Marvel acknowledged the possibility that an exclusive 
dealer's prorrotional effort might be superior to that 
of a rrulti-line dealer, but dismissed this as supporting 
an efficiency argurrent, because he thouglt if that was 
the case exclusive dealing would voluntarily be adopted 
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by dealers. 
Steur disagrees that stimulation of suppliers' efforts 
is the only pro-corrpetitive effect of exclusive dealing. 
Even though exclusive dealing might ITB.Ximise the profits 
of both supplier and distributor, dependence on one 
supplier makes such arrangerrents an unattractive 
proposition to undertake voluntarily. He points out 
that often the arrangerrents are undertaken for pragrratic 
reasons, eg, because a dealer has limited space or 
facilities, so cannot handle rrore than one brand.
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9.3 ANTI-CCMPEI'ITIVE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE DEALIN:; 
Three anti-corrpetitive effects of exclusive dealing have 
been suggested: 
( 1 ) Foreclosure of rivals; 
(2) Reduction of choice; and 
(3) Under certain conditions, higher prices. 
The first possibly anti-corrpetitive effect of exclusive 
dealing is foreclosure of access to distribution outlets 
so that it is difficult for rivals to enter the rrarket 
and corrpete. This rray be achieved by creating barriers 
to entry or by raising rivals' costs of an essential 
ingredient. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that exclusive dealing 
is anti-corrpetitive because it reduces the range of 
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choice available to buyers, while foreclosing rival 
suppliers from doing business with exclusive dealers. 
Posner does not accept that that has any effect on 
corrpetition, because one finn is rerroved from the rrarket 
place, but another is substituted. Moreover according 
to Posner, if the foreclosure is the result of conduct 
by a dominant firm at an adjoining stage of production, 
that precludes anti-coopetitive effects, because a rival 
firm is free to enter both stages of production 
concurrently, since the foreclosure limits only single-
stage entry. Posner's analysis relates to a single product 
f
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inn. 
Comanor
85 argues that Posner's analysis falls down when 
applied to rrultiproduct finns with the likelihood of 
substantial economies of scale and scope. Economies 
of scope occur when costs substantially decrease in 
distributing a large nurrber of products. The ordinary 
rreaning of economies of scale is that costs decrease 
in distributing larger quantities of products. Cananor 
argues tlm exclusive dealing arrangerrents may have anti-
corrpetitive effects when there are substantial economies 
of scale and scope in the distribution sector, because 
the inposition of an exclusive dealing arrangerrent may 
raise rivals' costs of distribution. 'Ihis argurrent was 
developed jointly with Frech in an article entitled "The 
cmpetitive effects of vertical agreerrents?
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The CaPanor and Frech analysis illustrates the third 
anti-coopetitive effect of exclusive dealing. It derives 
the rrarket conditions under which exclusive dealing can 
result in prices to consurrers that are higher than they 
would have paid in the absence of the practice. 
Cananor and Frech use two single product coopanies -
an original manufacturer (M) and a new entrant (E) in 
their exarrple. 'Iwo classes of custarers exist: 
1) Class A who perceive M' s product as superior and 
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are therefore prepared to pay rrore to obtain it, 
ie, they have a brand preference; 
2) Class B who perceive no difference between M' s 
product and E's product. 
The analysis depends on two assllllptions: 
1) That M's distribution rrergin, ie, what it costs M 
to distribute the product including the retailer's 
rrerk-up, stays constant both with and without 
exclusive dealing -
a) Because of economies of scale and scope under 
multi-product distribution before exclusive 
dealing is irrposed; and 
b) Because of economies that result fran exclusive 
dealing. 
Once exclusive dealing is irrposed E can no longer 
take advantage of the l~r costs of a multi-product 
distribution channel and consequently rrust pay the 
increased costs of a single-product distributor. 
2) Even though exclusive dealing rray result in lower 
distribution costs M might decide to price at the 
sarre level as its corrpetitors. 
Assurre the following: 
Cost (c) 
Distribution rrergin for Mand E hefore 
exclusive dealing (also M's di8tribution 
rrergin after exclusive dealing) 
E's distribution rrergin after exclusive 
dealing (X) 
Brand preference (B) 
$ 
800 
150 
175 
100 
Comanor and Frech found that prices to Class B consurrers 
in the presence of exclusive dealing v.ere always higher 
than without exclusive dealing, because of the increased 
costs of distribution through alternative distribution 
channels. For exarrple, 
Before exclusive dealing 
After exclusive dealing 
C+D 
C+X 
800+150=$950 
800+175=$975 
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Whether Class A custorrers are better off or worse off 
under exclusive dealing depends on whether M adopts a 
high- or a low-price strategy. If M adopts a low-price 
strategy, it prices so that the price of its product 
to consurrers is no higher than the price of E's product 
to them, that is: C+X 800+175=$975. Corrpare 
that to the price of M's product to consurrers without 
exclusive dealing: C+B+D 800+100=150=$1050. 
For Class A custorrers to face higher prices under 
exclusive dealing the increased cost of distributing 
the product alone rrust exceed the sum of the brand 
preference plus the rrulti-product distribution cost, ie, 
on the figures quoted above, E rrust exceed $250 (B+D). 
Put another way, the arrount of the brand preference 
premium must be less than the difference between the 
multi-product distribution cost (D) and E's distribution 
costs after exclusive dealing, ie, in the above exarrple 
(b) rrust be less than $25. Class A custorrers will face 
lower prices if the opposite applies, ie, X is less than 
B+D or Bis greater than X-D. 
If M adopts a high-price strategy it sets the highest 
price Class A custorrers will stand. The corrparison is: 
Without exclusive dealing 
With exclusive dealing 
C+B+D 
C+B+X 
800+100=150=$1050 
800+100+175=$1075 
Therefore, when M adopts a high-price strategy, prices 
to both classes of custorrers are higher in the presence 
of exclusive dealing. 
Cananor and Frech conclude: 
"The irrplications of this analysis are striking. 
Under the specified rrarket conditions, the original 
manufacturer profits by .inposing exclusive dealing 
requirerrents on his distributors8 
regardless of 
his choice of pricing strategy." 
7 
No rrention of this scenario for exclusive dealing being 
anti-ccnpetitive was rrade in the judgrrents of the Carrrerce 
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Comnission or the High Court in the F&P case. It ~uld 
be interesting to know what such an analysis carried 
out in that case would ha.ve revealed, but there is 
insufficient inforrna.tion in the judgrrents to allow it 
to be tested. 
It seems likely that it ~uld be feasible to use such 
an analysis to provide the court in a future case with 
rrore inforrna.tion on whether an EDA is anti-coopetitive. 
Corrpanies knOW' their production costs and F&P was able 
to tell the Coomission that exclusive dealing saved it 
$50 per unit in distribution costs. That only leaves 
the brand preference figure. Finns that engage in cost-
plus pricing might have difficulty ~..iantifying such a 
figure. For other firms one ~uld ha.veto consider how 
accurate the inforrna.tion they base this figure on is; 
whether in reality it is nothing rrore than a best esti.m3.te 
and as a conse~Jence may be too unreliable to use in 
an assessrrent of anti-coopetitiveness. 
9.4 ROIE OF EC0r,.n,1IC EVIDENCE IN EXCLUSIVE DEALING CASES 
What is the role of economic evidence in exclusive dealing 
cases? Generally, direct evidence of whether there has 
been a substantial lessening of corrpetition in a rrerket 
will not be available, so courts will have to decide 
this question on the basis of ci.rcurrstantial evidence 
as to conditions in the rrarket and the conduct of finns.
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As inoicated by the previous~ subsections, F.DAs may 
ha.ve a nurrber of pro- and anti-CC<q:)etitive effects. 
Economists ha.ve developed rrodels that p:redict the irrpact 
rrarket structure a~d other factors present in a rrerket 
have on corrpetition. The economic evidence presented 
to courts is a sLrrplified version of the economic theory 
of the m::xlels, given to help courts rreke an ir.fonred 
decisicn about what the likely state of CO!Tl,"'E?tition in 
the market is. 
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The High Court in the F&P case treated the economic 
evidence placed before it in the sarre way as it would 
treat any other expert evidence. It stated: 
"We prefer to search for the various indicia of 
anti-coopetitive behaviour from the evidence, ending 
up with a judgrrent - alrrost a jury gigestion - famed 
by harkening to econanic opinion." 
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10. FRAMEWORK FOR A SECTION 27 Ir-OUIRY INID SUBSTM'TIALLY 
LESSENING CCf,/iPETITION 
'Ihe High Court judgrrent in the F&P case suggests that 
the section 27 test of "substantially lessening co.-rpetition 
in a rrarket" involves four steps: 
(1) ~fine the rrarket; 
( 2) Analyse the structure and functioning of the mrrket; 
( 3) Weigh the pro- and anti-corrpetilive effects of the 
practice; 
(4) The Court must make a value judgrrent as to whether 
the practice substantially lessens canpetition in 
a rrarket. 
While that frarre"v.Drk "v.Duld apply to all vertical restraint 
cases arising under section 27, the content of the analyses 
at steps (2) and (3) will differ depending on the practice 
involved. ( See the discussion in Part 9 .1 of this paper 
as to the different pro- and anti-cOITl)etitive effects 
of vertical restraints.) 
The coopetition test the High Court in the F&P case found 
to be appropriate in exclusive dealing cases was: 
- exclusive dealing 
- in conjunction with barriers to entry at the retail 
level 
- and the absence of actual or potential corrpetitors 
who can exercise a real and significant influence upon 
the conduct of the incurrbent firm 
- rray strengthen rrarket power and substantially lessen 
coopetition. 
10.l STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF 'IHE MARKET 
The High Court in the F&P case accepted that a rrarket 
is a dynamic process. It stated that the EOC should 
be seen in that context and rrarket factors should be 
considered in that light. In its analysis of the rrarket 
in which an EDA exists the court is looking for evidence 
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to indicate the extent to which the EDA has reduced 
interbrand caipetition or stimulated it. 
10.1.1 Barriers to entry 
Both the Australian Trade Practices Tribunal in the 
Queensland Co-operative Milling case
90 and the arbitral 
tribunal in Mobil
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referred to barriers to entry as 
being the rrost inportant elerrent of market structure. 
This is because barriers to entry may prevent or hinder 
caipetitors fran entering or expanding in a market. 
As a general rule, the less caipetition there is in a 
market, the rrore likely the market is to show anti-
Ca11)etitive effects. 
What constitutes a barrier to entry? In its decision 
Re Fisher & Paykel Ltd 
92 the majority of the Comrerce 
Carmission drew a distinction between entry costs and 
in 
entry barriers. It said that not all entry costs represent 
a barrier: a judgrrent has to be made as to their extent 
and irrpact . 
It is clear that the rrere fact a corrpetitor or new entrant 
will have to incur extra costs in order to expand or 
enter the market, will not be sufficient to constitute 
a barrier. 93 However, there is no consensus in the 
econanic literature about what constitutes an entry barrier. 
A range of costs and circurrstances have been suggested 
as deterring entry and many economists have gone on to 
consider the effect these have on the efficient allocation 
94 of resources. For ex.arrple, Weizsacker's definition 
of barriers to entry is: 
"[A] barrier to entry is a cost of producing which 
must be borne by a fi.rm which seeks to enter into 
an industry but is not borne by fi.rms already in 
the industry and which irrplies a distortion in the 
alloca9!on of resources from the social p::>inl of 
view." 
Before the High Court in the F&P case a nunber of factors 
were argued as p::>ssibly creating barriers to entry: 
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- foreclosure of access to an irrportant corrponent; 
- duration of the EDA; 
- sunk costs. 
Other factors that could constitute barriers to entry 
~re rrentioned: 
- irrport controls and tariff barriers; 
- econanies of scale; 
- transport costs; 
lack of opportunity for expansion.
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The High Court found tht irrport controls and tariffs 
had once created a substantial barrier to entry/expansion 
in the whitegoods market, but Australian whitegoods are 
now licence exerrpt and duty free and further reductions 
in tariffs on whitegoods fran other countries will occur 
in future. 
10.1.1.1 Foreclosure of access to an irrportant corrponent 
Foreclosure of access to an irrportant CO!TTfX)nent is one 
of the possible anti-corrpetitive effects of EDAs. In 
the F&P case counsel for Ehail/Sirrpson argued that because 
of its EOC F&P had been able to foreclose its corrpetitors 
from getting access to the best retail outlets. Evidence 
before the Coomission and the High Court showed that 
55 percent of whitegoods retailing outlets, accounting 
for about 75 percent of sales, ~re F&P franchised outlets. 
While the High Court accepted that F&P had had the pick 
of sites and dealers for historical reasons, it thought 
that demand for retail space was elastic. If the demand 
was there space 'WOUld be rrade available by: 
(a) existing retailers selling browngoods and/or other 
goods; 
(b) expansion of space in existing outlets; 
(c) new retail space being built; 
(d) F&P dealers converting to non-exclusive outlets. 
It did not accept that F&P was foreclosing retail space 
from carpetitors in the rredium tenn, although short tenn 
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that might be the case. The difficulty F&P's corrpetitors 
-were having establishing themselves in retail outlets 
was no rrore than -would be expected given the history 
of irrport and tariff protection that had existed in l\ew 
Zealand until 1985. 
10.1.1.2 Duration of the EDAs 
A rrajor area of disagreerrent between the rrajority and 
the minority of the Carrrerce Comnission in Re Fisher 
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& Paykel Ltd concerned the effect the 90-days' written 
notice F&P dealers -were required to give to terminate 
the EDA had upon entry or expansion in the retail rrarket. 
The rrajority considered that the tie was not of short 
or finite duration. It relied on the fact that termination 
of the EDA by dealers is a rare event and that termination 
results in a cormercial penalty, because the dealer no 
longer has access to F&P products, which account for 
about 75 percent of whiteware sales. 
The minority argued that the tie was of soort duration, 
because with changing rrarket conditions and potential 
coopetition from irrported whitegoods, changeover from 
supply by F&P to supply by rival coopetitors could occur 
quickly. 
The High Court, on appeal, while acknowledging that no 
F&P dealer had rrade the switch, concluded: 
"The EOC can be terminated without penalty on only 
90 days' written notice and could well be 
terminated if a dealer -were to receive a corrparable 
package from an F&P carpetitor." 
No guidance is given in the High Court's judgrrent about 
what length of tie \'.Duld have the effect of foreclosing 
access to retail outlets. It is likely that will be 
a question to be decided on the facts of each case. 
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10.1.1.3 Sunk costs 
The question arose in the F&P case whether advertising 
is a sunk cost or a fixed cost and whether either or 
both of these costs create an entry barrier. 
Baurrol and Willig define fixed costs as -
"those costs that are not reduced, even in the long 
run, by decreases in output so l~~g as production 
is not discontinued altogether". 
Exarrples of fixed costs are rental payrrents or capital 
expenditure that can be recouped upon exit from the 
. d t 1 d . . lOO in us ry, ess eprec1.at1.on. 
Sunk costs are -
"those costs that .•• cannot be eliminated, even 
by total cessation of production. As such, once 
comnitted, sunk costs are no longer foo_>Ortion of 
the opportunity cost of production". 
Exarrples of sunk costs are capital expenditure that cannot 
be recouped upon exit from the industry, except for 
scrap or advertising where the business is not sold as 
a going concern, so does not contribute to the intangible 
asset of goodwill.
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According to Baurrol and Willig, fixed costs do not create 
an entry barrier because they fall on both the incumbent 
finn and the new entrant. Sunk costs may constitute 
an entry barrier: 
"This is because the entrant faces both higher 
increrrental costs and risks as it invests in sunk 
capital and advertising, expenditures which for 
the incunbent are past and absorbed costs. A sunk 
cost may therefore becare an entry barrier by 
increasing the adverse consequences of failure, 
and its role as a barrier to entry depends on the 
risk to which it subjects the entrant. A weakness 
of this branch of literature which should be noted 
is that many so-called sunk costs only attain this 
status on the failure of the business (eg, expenditures 
on advertising). H~ver, if the business succeeds 
and/or its a,.mership is transferred, these sarre 
costs are viewed as investrrents in ~b~gible assests 
(eg goodwill). [Footnotes omitted]" 
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The najority of the Coomission in Re Fisher & Paykel 
Ltd decided that advertising was a sunk cost that would 
rrake entry or expansion in the whitegoods rrarket difficult 
for corrpetitors. 
The minority, with whose argurrents the High Court agreed 
generally, viewed advertising as a fixed cost, because 
the establishrrent of brand awareness and a reputation 
are not only costs associated with start-up; they are 
an on-going cost for rrarket participants in the face 
of both actual and potential corrpetition. Advertising 
is available to be purchased by everyone. The fact that 
a new entrant will have to spend rrore on advertising 
than an established firm does not constitute a barrier 
to entry. It is a difficulty of carpeting against an 
established incurrbent; that difficulty is greater the 
better the incurrbent's reputation and products are. 
Sorre econanists argue that it is the cost of inforrration 
that creates the real barrier and that advertising nay 
actually reduce that barrier by lowering consurrers' 
. f . d h t 104 dd ' t' wh'l m orrration an searc cos s. In a i ion, i e 
the new entrant nay have to spend rrore in advertising 
to establish itself, if it was not able to do that, that 
would create rrore of a barrier. 
The High Court in the F&P case concluded that there were 
no barriers to entry in the whitegoods rrarket. Therefore, 
it was not necessary for the Court to consider what level 
of entry barriers would be sufficient to rreel the carpetition 
test. However, the quote fran Mr Jennings that the Court 
approved suggested that exclusive dealing in conjunction 
with existing entry barriers would have lo result in 
a "substantial" barrier at the retail levei.
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10.1.2 Actual or r:otential conpetition 
The question arises whether in any analysis of the state 
of conpetition in a rrarket, actual conpetition alone 
is relevant,or whether potential corrpetition rray also 
be taken into account. Section 3(3) of the Coorrerc~ 
Act provides: 
"the effect of corrpetition in a rrarket shall be 
determined by reference to all factors that affect 
corrpetition in that rrarket including coopetition 
from goods or services supplied or likely to be 
supplied by persons not resident or not carrying 
on business in New Zealand" . ( Erophasis added) 
Potential coopetition is also referred to in the definition 
of 11\\Drkable conpetition" the High Court in the F&P case 
adopted ( quoted on p 21 of this paper) . 
Having established that potential conpetition is relevant, 
it should be noted that the likely effect of potential 
coopetition was not referred to by the rrajority of the 
Coorrerce Coomission in the F&P case at first instance. 
Yet, it seem; to be the factor that rrost influenced the 
minority of the Coomission to decide that F&P's EOC did 
not substantially lessen conpetition. 
What is potential ccnpetition? Previous Coomission 
decisions have errphasised that: 
"the real potentiality of corrpetition depends, not 
upon the rrere existence of coopetitors 'on the 
fring' which might or might not corrpete, but upon 
evidence of a real and significant influence upon 
the incurrbent firm or upon potential corrpetitors 
so as to provide a coopetitive dit6tPline or a 
deterrent to entry respectively". (Enphasis 
added) 
In order to be able to exercise a real and significant 
influence on the incurrbent firm's conduct it is necessary 
for carpetitors or potential corrpetitors to be able to 
achieve "successful
11107 or "viable
11108 entry into the 
rrarket, although it is not necessary that they actually 
do so. Often the threat of corrpetition will be 
sufficient to constrain the incurrbent firm. 
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What constitutes a "real and significant influence"? 
In F&P's case the minority identified actual behavioural 
changes: 
"[T]here was evidence to suggest that actual/potential 
corrpetition from irrports had indeed influenced F&P's 
conduct, eg the bringing forward ot its R&D programre. 
The fact that F&P itself ilvported 7 per cent of 
total whitegoods supply in 1986/87, and 3 per cent 
in 1987/88, is also indicative of the Corrpany's 
awareness of the changing rrarket circum.stances and 
of the needle~ respond to them on behalf of 
consurrers." 
The minority -went on to inply that it "t.Duld be open to 
the Carrnission to conclude that a finn that engaged in 
pro-corrpetitive/efficiency-inducing behaviour was 
constrained in its conduct, even though no actual change 
had occurred in its conduct.
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There is a link between entry barriers and potential 
corrpetition. Irrports are a source of potential corrpetition 
when barriers to entry are low. The High Court disagreed 
with the finding by the rrajority of the Cornnission in 
the F&P case that the level of inports "t.Duld be unlikely 
to rise unless F&P's EOC was rerroved. It stated: 
"What is absolutely clear is that the rrarket is 
highly contestable and that F&P is constrained by 
the threat of rrore inports which will ilr1rease, 
given suitable corrpetitive conditions". 
10.1.3 Market power 
There was evidence in the F&P case that F&P branded 
products (Kelvinator and Frigidaire) sold through F&P 
franchised dealers account for approxirrately 75 percent 
of whitegoods sold, while products rranufactured by F&P 
under the Shacklock brand and rrarketed by Whiteware Corp 
through non-F&P franchised dealers account for 10 percent 
of whitegoods sold. The High Court found it necessary 
to add a notional loading of 5 percent to F&P's rrarket 
share to recognise Whiteware Corporation's contribution. 
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The High Court agreed with the Comission that rrarket 
share is not a good indicator of the anti-competitive 
effects of a practice. The Court found a cornrent on 
rrarket share from the joint judgrrent of Mason CJ and 
Wilson Jin the High Court of Australia in Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Proprietary 
Co Ltd to be helpful: 
"A large rrarket share rray -well be evidence of rrarket 
:p::,wer (see Roche, at p 521; p 275 of G1LR), but 
the ease with which carpetitors would be able to 
enter the rrarket rrust also be considered. It is 
only when for sorre reason it is not rational or 
possible for new entrants to participate in the 
rrarket that a fi:rm can have market po-wer: (see 
Continental Can at p 248; p 227 of G1LR). There 
rrust be barriers to entry. As Professor FM 
Scherer has written, 'significant entry barriers 
are the sine qua non of rronopoly and oligopoly, 
for ••• sellers have little or no enduring po-wer 
over price when entry barriers are nonexistent': 
Scherer, Industrial Market, Structure and 
F.c:onomic Perf o~ze, 2nd ed. ( 1980 ) , p 11 . " 
{Eirphasis added) 
Before the High Court in the F&P case Em3.il/Simpson 
argued that product differentiation - the perception 
in the eyes of New Zealand consurrers and retailers that 
F&P's product and service package is superior - is both 
an entry barrier and a barrier to rrobility within the 
rrarket preventing F&P dealers fran rroving to other 
suppliers. The High Court accepted that F&P's rrarket 
power was to sorre extent 
agreed with the minority 
lightly taken away under 
Surrrcary 
enhanced by these factors, but 
that reputation should not be 
. . . 113 
the guise of protecting corrpet1t1on. 
The High Court concluded that F&P does have significant 
rrarket po-wer at the rrorrent, based on: 
- its having been the rronopoly supplier over a nurrber 
of years; 
- its New Zealand-based rranufacturing plant; 
- its high rrarket share; 
- its strong product and service package; 
57. 
- its strong dealer network, supported by the EDC, which 
provides significant product differentiation.
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However, because of the structure of the market with 
no significant entry barriers, corrpetitors established 
in the market and the potential for rrore corrpetition, 
F&P is constrained in what action it can take. 
10.2 PRO- AND ANTI-Ca1PETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE EDC 
A key question in the F&P case before the Coorrerce Corrmission 
was where in the analytical frarrework any pro-corrpetitive 
effects of the practice should be considered: 
- in the context of section 27 itself? 
- in the context of section 61, ie, as part of the [degree 
of] lessening in coopetition test? or 
- in the context of the public benefit test? 
'Ihe Corrmission found that it was appropriate to consider 
both pro- and anti-cmpetitive effects in ascertaining 
whether the substantially lessening corrpetition test 
in section 27 was rret. This was because the danger 
of artificially distancing the analysis of any anti-
corrpetitive effects of a practice from any pro-coopetitive 
effects could result in a distorted view of the corrpetition 
problem. The minority stated that this was of particular 
:irrportance in the case of vertical restraints because 
of their internationally recognised pro-corrpetitive/ 
pro-efficient capability as well as their anti-coopetitive 
capability in certain circl..llTlStances. 
The High Court agreed with the Corrmission that if it 
could be shown that the net effect of the EDC was to 
prorrote cmpetition, there could be no substantial 
. 27 115 
lessening of cmpetition in terms of section . 
In addition to pro- and anti-corrpetitive effects of the 
practice, the High Court stated that efficiencies and 
inefficiencies that result from the practice should also 
be weighed, leaving other public benefits to be considered 
58. 
under the public benefit test.
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is that a practice that is anti-coopetitive may nevertheless 
result in efficiency benefits. 
While it is not possible to define "efficiency", the 
minority of the Camri.ssion stated: 
"Efficiency effects can arise from organisational 
as well as from technological innovation; the general 
purpose of economic organisation is to devise 
arrangerrents which economise ~~7both production 
msts and transaction costs." 
An interesting question arises as a result of the 
enactment of a new section 3A by the Cormerce Arrendrrent 
Act 1990, which reads: 
"Where the Camri.ssion is required under this Act 
to determine whether or not, or the extent to which 
conduct will result, or will be likely to result, 
in a benefit to the public, the Camri.ssion shall 
have regard to any efficiencies that the Comnission 
mnsiders will result, or will be likely to result 
from that mnduct." 
It could be argued on the basis of that section that 
since Parlimrent has seen fit to provide expressly for 
a mnsideration of efficiencies in the public benefit 
test, it 'WOUld have done the smre if it intended 
efficiencies to be a factor to be considered in 
determining whether the substantially lessening 
corrpetition test in section 27 had been rret. 
Cpposing that, one can argue as follows. The general 
purpose of the Ccmrerce Act is to prorrote corrpetition 
as a rreans of enhancing economic efficiency. If 
efficiencies are excluded from the inquiry into the 
substantial lessening of corrpetition, practices that 
while reducing corrpetition, on balance increase 
efficiency 'WOUld be prohibited. It seems likely that 
the courts will continue to consider efficiencies in 
both the substantially lessening canpetition test and 
the public benefit test. 
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The Corrrrerce Carrnission's position is that there is 
no inconsistency between section 3A and the consideration 
f ff . . ff . . ll8 o e 1c1ency e ects in the section 27 test. Section 
3A was inserted in the Act in recognition of current 
economic thinking that efficiencies are a public benefit. 
Another issue that arises in this area is how likely 
sorrething has to be before the Carrnission or the Court 
will accept it as a pro-cmpetitive (or anti-corrpetitive) 
effect of a practice. Referring to the fact that no 
F&P dealer had terminated their EDA with F&P, the High 
Court said, if a rrajor irrporter was to rrake a sufficient 
investrrent in its products and a sufficient carrnitrrent 
to the New Zealand rrarket it was not "beyond the bounds 
of possibility" ll 
9 
that it could rrake its tenns of dealing 
or its product package sufficiently attractive to rrake 
an existing F&P dealer change allegiance. The High Court 
agreed with the minority of the Carrnission that in this 
way the EDC was pro-crnpetitive because it: 
"encourages rival sellers to find better/different/ 
innovative/rrore cost-effective ways of producing/ 
delivering/servicing their branded products~~ 
of finding favour with whiteware consurrers". 
~spite the language the High Court used - not beyond 
the bounds of possibility - the likelihood of the EDC 
being pro-ccrrpetitive in the way the Court and the minority 
envisaged is probably quite high, given that F&P's 
~titors are rrultinational carpanies with wide 
experience of whitegoods retailing. The likelihood of 
a practice having a pro- and anti-carpetitive effect 
¼Duld surely go to the weight the Court would attach 
to such an effect. 
The pro-coopetitive effects of the EDC argued by F&P 
and accepted by the High Court were: 
(1) That the EDC protects F&P's investrrent in its 
dealers and products by reducing interbrand 
free riding, resulting in a higher level of 
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service in support of its products and an 
irrproved quality product; and 
(2) That the EDC provides benefits to consurrers through 
lower real prices achieved through cost savings 
(arrounting to $50 per item
121) from this form of 
distribution and a higher level of efficiency. 
Against those had to be balanced the anti-coopetitive 
effects of the practice: 
(1) Short-term foreclosure of access retail outlets 
from cxxtpetitors; 
(2) Market power enhanced by economies of scale from 
undertaking production for Whiteware Corporation 
and product differentiation. However, the Court 
also referred to the diminution of F&P's rnarket 
power since irrport controls and tariff barriers 
had been lifted, as evidenced by its inability to 
retain its share of the dishwasher market (down 
from 100 percent market share to 55 percent). 
An additional factor referred to was side-by-side 
retailing. Although the High Court accepted that side-
by-side retailing facilitated switch selling, which is 
anti-coopetitive, it felt that that should be weighed 
against the pro-competitive effects of that rrethod of 
selling, including price <XXTpetition, ease of 
corrparison, consurrer choice, and cost and efficiency 
savings from a reduced nurrber of outlets. On balance 
it thought this factor did not favour one side or the 
other. 
10.3 VALUE JUI01ENT BY THE COURT 
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A passage from Fitzgerald J's judgment in Hecar was 
relied on by the High Court as articulating the dilemna 
it found itself in: 
"The ulti.m3.te question for resolution in this 
proceeding is dependent upon the inference to be 
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drawn rather than upon any rratter in respect of 
which the learned prirrary Judge possessed any 
advantage over this Court on appeal, although, of 
course, the inference which he drew is to be kept 
in mind. Indeed, in the end, the answer in this 
case really depends on little rrore than one's own 
instinctive irrpressions forrred by weighing the 
various considerations in the particular market 
which favour one view of another." 
From this it can be seen that in the end, the result 
in any case will depend on the inferences the Court draws 
from the facts put before it. Therein lies the key to 
the different doc.:sions reached by the majority of the 
Carrrerce Carrnission and the High Court in the F&P case. 
en the basis of the structure and functioning of the 
market and the net pro-coopetitive effects of the EDC, 
the High Court arrived at its judgrrent ( "Not without 
sorre resitation ... ") that "the rrajority was in error 
in finding that the EOC breached S.27 11 •
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11. PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST 
Section 61(6) of the Corrrrerce Act 1986 as amended provides: 
"The Comnission shall not rreke a determination 
granting an authorisation pursuant to an application 
under section 58(1) to (4) of this Act unless it 
is satisfied that -
(b) The giving effect to the provision of the contract, 
arrangerrent or understanding; 
will in all the circumstances result, or be likely 
to result, in a benefit to the public which ¼Duld 
outweigh the lessening in corrpetition that -would 
result or -would be likely to result or is deerred 
to result therefrom." 
The elerrents c£ the public benefit test are that the practice 
will result or be likely to result in: 
- a benefit 
- to the public 
- arising fran the restriction of corrpetition 
- which -would outweigh 
- the lessening in corrpetition. 
In its decisions the Canrerce Cornnission has consistently 
taken the line that quantification of the degree of 
lessening of crnpetition is required, because it aids 
the weighing process carried out in the public benefit 
test. In Re New Zealand Vegetable Growers Federation 
Inc & Ors the Comnission stated: 
"Although the words of section 61(6) in this respect 
are obscure, comronsense dictates that, in 'weighing' 
the Corrrnission is required to assess the extent 
of the lessening of corrpetition which actually exists 
as a result of the practice and then consider the 
detrirrental effects 1~ well as any positive effects] 
arising therefrom. " 
Prior to the enactrrent of the Canrerce Act 1990, before 
the Cornnission could consider the public benefit issue, 
it was required to have decided that it believed the 
practice had or was likely to have the purpose or effect 
of substantially lessening crnpetition. That was the 
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jurisdiction issue discussed in Part 4 of this paper. 
For the purpose of the public benefit test the Coomission 
would sinply quantify the lessening of coopetition and 
proceed to ~igh the benefits and detrirrents. 
Under the arrended Act the Coomission assures, without 
deciding, that the practice substantially lessens 
corrpetition. 'Therefore, it will now be necessary for 
the purposes of the public benefit test for the parties 
to argue the question of whether the practice substantially 
lessens corrpetition, to enable the Carmission to form 
a conclusion on the degree of lessening of conpetition. 
Public benefit has been the subject of analysis elsewhere, 
so it is not intended to canvas the ma.tter here.
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Strictly speaking, the High Court in F&P was not required 
to consider the public benefit issue because it concluded 
that F&P's EOC did not substantially lessen coopetition 
in the ma.rket. Ho~ver, it briefly stated its view on 
the ma.tter in case its judgrrent was appealed. 
Private benefits in the form of cost savings achieved 
through greater efficiency, even if not passed onto 
consurers, have an elerrent of public benefit.
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'Ihe ma.in public benefit argued to arise from the use 
of the EOC was the continued manufacture of whitegoods 
in New Zealand by F&P. Neither the ma.jority of the Corrrrerce 
Canission, nor the High Court, accepted that the presence 
or otherwise of the EOC, 'MJUld determine whether or not 
F&P continued manufacturing in New Zealand. 'Ihe significance 
of this argurrent is that any benefits must stem from 
the practice. The Court did accept that if the coopany 
closed up there "WOuld be sorre loss of errployrrent in New 
Zealand, which 'WOuld be unlikely to be replaced. Any 
losses of F&P errployees at the distribution and retail 
level would be replaced by coopetitors' erll)loyees. 
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t-either did the High Court accept that if the EOC went 
F&P would cease to be a substantial exporter of whitegoods 
and whitegoods technology, although it accepted there 
might be sorre initial loss of profits as a result of 
a reduction in rrarket share. 
Both the rrajority of the Carrrerce Conmission and the 
High Court found that F&P had failed to rrake out public 
benefits that v.0uld be sufficient to warrant authorisation 
of the practice. 
The law changes irrplerrented by the Carrrerce Arrendrrent 
Act 1990 have had the effect of changing the focus of 
cases before the Carrrerce Conmission. In the Trade 
Practices Acts 1958 and 1975 the public interest was 
the all-irrportant factor. Under the 1986 Act and section 
27 in particular, that changed to carpetition. Unless 
the practice substantially lessened corrpetition, public 
benefit was not an issue. I'bw, the issue before the 
Conmission is, does the practice have a net public 
benefit? 
It has been the experience in a:impetition law cases in 
t-ew Zealand that few have been able to rreet the rigorous 
requirerrents of the public benefit test. What will be 
the irrplications of this change? 
Firstly, it is possible that because public benefit is 
the substantive issue rrore effort will be channelled 
into thinking up public benefit argurrents. 
Secondly, rrost cases that will arise in the future will 
involve proposed practices. If they do not rreet the 
public benefit test they will no doubt not be irrplerrented. 
This is even rrore likely to be the case given the increased 
penalty limits enacted by the Carrrerce Arrendrrent Act. 
With the threat of heavy penalties, conpanies are unlikely 
to be willing to institute a practice, wait for a coopetitor 
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to sue them, and ho~ they can prove that the practice 
does not substantially lessen corrpetition. A further 
deterrent to the act and hope scenario is the fact that 
the decision whether a practice substantially lessens 
corrpetition is so heavily dependent on the inferences 
the Court draws from the facts before it. It will be 
alrrost irrpossible in any case to advise clients how a 
Court is likely to decide a ffi3.tter. 
Thirdly, and rrost serious, is the problem illustrated 
by the F&P case: if that case cane before the Comrerce 
Ccmnission for authorisation today, authorisation 'i.DUld 
not be granted because it could not rreet the public 
benefit test. For the reasons given in the previous 
paragraph, the practice v-.Duld be unlikely to be continued 
with. Yet, the EDC was found not to substantially lessen 
coopetition. That result - that practices that do not 
substantially lessen coopetition would be discouraged -
seem; to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act, 
which is II to prorrote conpeti tion 11 ( errphasis added) . 
Instead of having the situation that the Act recognises 
other IX)licies exist that, when a practice substantially 
lessens corrpetition, outweigh conpetition as a IX)licy; 
the Act now says, net public benefits always override 
corrpetition as a policy in authorisation proceedings. 
When the new section 3A inserted by the Carrrerce Arrendrrent 
Act is taken into account the fact that the corrpetition 
IX)licy is subservient to net public benefit in authorisation 
proceedings perhaps results in less of a conflict with 
the purposes of the Act. That is because section 3A 
requires that in considering benefit to the public the 
ccmnission shall have regard to efficiencies that will, 
or will be likely, to result fran the conduct; and the 
role of the Act is to prorrote corrpetition as a rreans 
of achieving efficient allocation of resources. 
However, the new section is not likely to result in rrore 
cases being able to rreet the public benefit test, because 
66. 
the Comnission and the Courts have always considered 
efficiencies in the public benefit test. 
67. 
12. OOES NEW ZEALAND NEED A SECTION LIKE SECTION 47 
(AUSTRALIA)? 
Reference has been made at various points throughout 
this paper to the specific section covering exclusive 
dealing in the Australian Trade Practices Act, section 
47 (a copy of which is attached to this paper as 
Appendix 1). As mentioned on p 38 of this paper, the 
minority of the Canrerce Cmmission in the F&P case 
suggested that the reason the Coomerce Act did not include 
a separate section dealing with exclusive dealing was 
because of the progress that had been made in understanding 
the carpetitive effects of EDAs in the period between 
the enactment of the Trade Practices Act in 1974 and 
the Canrerce Act in 1986. Instead of being considered 
to have anti-corrpetitive effects, exclusive dealing is 
now considered to be a normal comrercial practice unless 
it is shown to substantially lessen corrpetition. The 
High Court also agreed with this. Hill and Jones have 
suggested that a general standard was adopted in respect 
of exclusive dealing because the US experience had shown 
that the adopting of a specific exclusive dealing provision 
added nothing to general standards inposed under the 
US equivalent of section 27.
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92ct.ims 47( 1) and ( 10) (a) of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act prohibit a corporation from engaging in 
the practice of exclusive dealing if the conduct "has 
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, 
of substantially lessening corrpetition". That is to 
the same effect as section 27 of the Comrerce Act. 
However, section 27 has a wider ani::>it than section 47 -
all forms of exclusive dealing, including third line 
forcing, are subject to the substantially lessening 
canpetition test. Under section 47(10) of the Trade 
Practices Act third line forcing is not subject to the 
substantially lessening corrpetition test; it is illegal, 
but authorisable. 
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The Australian Trade Practices Act provides two rreans 
by which a corporation wanting to engage in exclusive 
dealing can avoid liability for suit: notification or 
authorisation. Where a notification has been lodged 
with the Trade Practices Coornission under section 93 
setting out the conduct or proposed conduct that nay 
contravene section 47, the conduct is deerred not to 
substantially lessen coopetition. If the Coornission 
thinks the corporation's conduct does substantially lessen 
corrpetition it nay conduct an inquiry and if the corrpetition 
test is rret, and the conduct does not result in a net 
public benefit, protection nay be withdrawn (sections 
93 ( 3) and ( 4) and 93A). Third line forcing is not a 
notifiable practice. 
The l\ew Zealand authorisation sections (sections 58 and 
61) have the sane effect as the Australian authorisation 
sections (sections 88 and 90), but New Zealand has no 
equivalent to the notification procedure. 
On 1 July 1988 the Australian and l\ew Zealand Governrrents 
signed a Merrorandum of Understanding on the Harrronisation 
of Business Law. Under that agreerrent the parties were 
required to -
" ... examine the scope for h3.rrronisation of business 
laws and regulatory practices, including the rerroval 
of any irrpedirrents that are identified ... " 
and identify areas appropriate for harrronisation, by 
30 June 1990. In respect to exclusive dealing the Report 
to Governrrents by the Steering Corrrnittee of Officials 
of 30 June 1990 concluded: 
"8.20 Section 47 of the Australian Trade Practices 
Act contains a prohibition against exclusive 
dealing. There is no corresponding provision 
in the l\ew Zealand Cormerce Act. However, 
the Steering Carrnittee considers that, except 
in respect to third line forcing, the l\ew 
Zealand provision that prohibits agreerrents 
that substantially lessen corrpetition (section 
27) is similar in effect to the Australian 
pro~ision that prohibits exclusive dealing. 
69. 
Australian law allows corporations to obtain 
irrmunity for exclusive dealing conduct (other 
than third line forcing) , by lodging a 
notification with the Australian Trade Practices 
Cornnission that it is engaging in such conduct. 
Notification is subject to the review by 
the Australian Trade Practices Cornnission 
using authorisation criteria. 
"8.21 In Australia third line forcing is prohibited 
per se whereas in t-ew zealand it is subject 
to the substantially lessening corrpetition 
test. The Steering Corrmittee considers that 
the per se nature of the Australian provision 
should be reviewed." 
The problem with relying on section 27 of the Comrerce 
Act in its present form to cover exclusive dealing stems 
fran the way provision has been drafted. Under section 
27 the cause of action is entering into or giving effect 
to a contract that substantially lessens corrpetition. 
A disgruntled dealer, therefore, who wanted to challenge 
the legality of an EDA he or she was a party to, would 
find themself without an action. If the EDA was proved 
to substantially lessen corrpetition the contract would be 
treated as void being contrary to public policy. Section 89(5) 
of the Comrerce Act confirms that the Illegal Contracts Act 
1970 does not apply to contracts entered into in contravention 
of the Comrerce Act~ At camon ~ ~ 8ies to a void contract 
cannot take any action to enforce it. 
By contrast, the cause of action under section 47 of 
the Australian Trade Practices Act is engaging in the 
practice of exclusive dealing, so the disgruntled dealer 
would have no trouble bringing an action alleging the 
practice contravened the Act. 
S1..IITTT1clIY 
eurrent econanic thinking is that exclusive dealing is 
as likely to have pro-corrpetitive/pro-efficient effects 
as it is to have anti-coopetitive effects, so it should 
be treated as a normal comrercial activity unless shown 
to substantially lessen coopetition. On that basis a 
specific section to cover exclusive dealing is not necessary. 
70. 
However,in the New Zealand context a separate section 
frarred in terms similar to section 47 of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act is arguably required to provide a 
disgruntled party to the exclusive dealing contract with 
an action. While there are obviously ways the problem 
with section 27 in its present form could be overcorre, 
eg, by the dealer procuring a ccxr.petitor of the supplier 
to bring an action, it seems unsatisfactory that it should 
be necessary to go those lengths. 
71. 
13. CONCLUSIONS 
After the F&P case the law relating to exclusive dealing 
under section 27 of the Cormerce Act 1986 is reasonably 
clear. Exclusive dealing is to be considered a norrral 
cormercial practice unless it substantially lessens 
corrpetition. The High Court in the F&P case used US 
case law and economic thinking in particular to help 
it to establish a frarrework that is appropriate for the 
analysis of exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing has 
different corrpetitive effects from other vertical 
restraints, so the appropriate economic analysis requires 
that the reduction of interbrand corrpetition be ~ighed 
against the stimulation of interbrand corrpetition. 
The coopetition test the High Court in F&P set dawn was: 
exclusive dealing, in conjunction with barriers to entry, 
absence of actual or potential corrpetition and rrarket 
power rray lead to a substantial lessening of corrpetition. 
It is likely that exclusive dealing plus barriers to 
entry must create a substantial barrier to entry. 
Ccxrpetitors rrust be able to achieve successful or viable 
entry into the rrarket. 
Since actual evidence of a substantial lessening of 
carpetition is unlikely to be available, economic evidence 
is a useful predictor of the irrP3ct rrarket structure 
and other factors present in the rrarket have on coopetition. 
Courts will use that evidence in the sarre way they would 
any other expert evidence, to infonn their analysis. 
In the end, however, the Judge has to rrake a value judgrrent 
as to whether or not he or she thinks the practice is 
anti-coopetitive. The result will very much depend on 
the inferences the Judge takes from the facts before 
him. 
'!WO further points are worth noting. Firstly, since 
the arrendrrents inserted into the Act by the Comrerce 
72. 
Arrendrrent Act 1990 the substantive issue in an 
authorisation application before the Cormerce Comnission 
is whether the practice results in net public benefits. 
This rray result in practices, although they do not 
substantially lessen carpetition, being refused 
authorisation because they do not produce net public 
benefits. 
Secondly, because of the way section 27 of the Act has 
been drafted, a disgruntled dealer who is a party to 
an EDA, and who wan1s to challenge the legality of the 
instrurrent, will not have an action. 'lb overcorre this 
problem it is recormended that !'ew Zealand should consider 
adopting a section covering exclusive dealing similar 
to section 47 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. 
With the High Court judgrrent in the F&P case, exclusive 
dealing has been approved by the Court as a legi t irrate 
corrpetitive t(X)l available to all the carpetitors in 
the whitegoods market should they so desire to use it. 
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APPENDIX 1 
1471 Exclusive dealing 
47. (I) Subject to this section, a corporation shall not, in trade or 
commerce, engage in the practice of exclusive dealing. 
(2) A corporation engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation-
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
(b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price; 
or 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, 
rebate or credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply of 
goods or services by the corporation, 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies, or 
offers or proposes to supply, the goods or services or, if that person is a 
body corporate, a body corporate related to that body corporate-
(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire goods or 
services, or goods or services of a particular kind or description, 
directly or indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from 
a competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation; 
(e) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, re-supply goods, or 
goods of a particular kind or description, acquired directly or 
indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from a 
competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation; or 
(f) in the case where the corporation supplies or would supply goods, 
will not re-supply the goods to any person, or will not, or will not 
except to a limited extent, re-supply the goods-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other 
than particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places. 
(3) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation refuses-
(a) to supply goods or services to a person; 
(b) to supply goods or services to a person at a particular price; or 
(c) to give or allow a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation 
to the supply or proposed supply of goods or services to a person, 
for the reason that the person or, if the person is a body corporate, 
a body corporate related to that body corporate-
(d) has acquired, or has not agreed not to acquire, goods or services, or 
goods or services of a particular kind or description, directly or 
indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from a 
competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation; 
\c) . has re-supplied. or has not agreed not to re-supply, goods, or goods 
of a particular k.ind or description, acquired directly or indirectly 
from a competitor of the corporation or from a competitor of a 
body corporate related to the corporation; or 
(t) in the case of a refusal in relation to the supply or proposed supply 
of goods, has re-supplied, or has not agreed not to re-supply, goods, 
or goods of a particular kind or description, acquired from the 
corporation to any person, or has re-supplied, or has not agreed not 
to re-supply, goods, or goods of a particular kind or description, 
acquired from the corporation-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other 
than particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places. 
(4) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation-
(a) acquires, or offers to acquire, goods or services; or 
(b) acquires, or offers to acquire, goods or services at a particular price, 
on the condition that the person from whom the corporation acquires or 
offers to acquire the goods or services or, if that person is a body 
corporate, a body corporate related to that body corporate will not supply 
goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind or description, 
to any person, or will not, or will not except to a limited extent, supply 
goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind or description -
(c) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than 
particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(d) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places. 
(5) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation refuses-
(a) to acquire goods or services from a person; or 
(b) to acquire goods or services at a particular price from a person, 
for the reason that the person or, if the person is a body corporate, a body 
corporate related to that body corporate has supplied, or has not agreed 
not to supply, goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind 
or description-
(c) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than 
particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(d) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places. 
(6) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation-
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
(b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price; 
or 
qn 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, 
rebate or credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply of 
goods or services by the corporation, 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplie~ or 
offers or proposes to supply the goods or services or, if that person 1s _a 
body corporate, a body corporate related to that ~Y _cor~rate will 
acquire goods or services of a particular kind or descnpt1on dtrectly or 
indirectly from another person. 
(7) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation refuses-
(a) to supply goods or services to a person; 
(b) to supply goods or services at a particular price to a person; or 
(c) to give or allow a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation 
to the supply of goods or services to a person, 
for the reason that the person or, if the person is a body corporate, a body 
corporate related to that body corporate has not acquired, or has not 
agreed to acquire, goods or services of a particular kind or description 
directly or indirectly from another person . 
(8) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation grants or renews, or makes it known that it will not exercise a 
power or right to terminate, a lease of, or a licence in respect of, land or a 
building or part of a building on the condition that another party to the 
lease or licence or, if that other party is a body corporate, a body 
corporate related to that body corporate-
(a) will not, or will not except to a limited extent-
(i) acquire goods or services, or goods or services of a particular 
kind or description, directly or indirectly from a competitor of 
the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate 
related to the corporation; or 
(ii) re-supply goods, or goods of a particular kind or description, 
acquired directly or indirectly from a competitor of the 
corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related 
to the corporation; 
(b) will not supply goods or services, or goods or services of a 
particular kind or description, to any person, or will not, or will not 
except to a limited extent, supply goods or services, or goods or 
services of a particular kind or description -
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other 
than particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places; or 
(c) will acquire goods or services of a particular kind or description 
directly or indirectly from another person not being a body 
corporate related to the corporation . 
(9) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation refuses to grant or renew, or exercises a power or right to 
terminate, a lease of, or a licence in respect of, land or a building or part of 
a building for the reason that another party to the lease or licence or, if 
100 
that other party is a body corporate, a body corporate related to that body 
corporate-
(a) has acquired, or has not agreed not to acquire, goods or services, or 
goods or services of a particular kind or description, directly or 
indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from a 
competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation; 
(b) has re-supplied, or has not agreed not to re-supply, goods, or goods 
of a particular kind or description, acquired directly or indirectly 
from a competitor of the corporation or from a competitor of a 
body corporate related to the corporation; 
(c) has supplied goods or services, or goods or services of a particular 
kind or description-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other 
than particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than 
particular places or classes of places; or 
(d) has not acquired, or has not agreed to acquire, goods or services of 
a particular kind or description directly or indirectly from another 
person not being a body corporate related to the corporation. 
(10) Sub-section (I) does not apply to the practice of exclusive dealing 
constituted by a corporation engaging in conduct of a kind referred to in 
sub-sections (2), (3), (4) or (5) or paragraphs (8) (a) or (b) or· (9) (a), (b) or (c) 
unless-
(a) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct has the purpose, 
or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition; or 
(b) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct, and the engaging 
by the corporation, or by a body corporate related to the 
corporation, in other conduct of the same or a similar kind, 
together have or are likely to have the effect of substantially 
lessening competition. 
(11) Sub-sections (8) and (9) do not apply with respect to-
(a) conduct engaged in by, or by a trustee for, a religious, charitable or 
public benevolent institution, being conduct engaged in for or in 
accordance with the purposes or objects of that institution; or 
(b) conduct engaged in in pursuance of a legally enforceable 
requirement made by, or by a trustee for, a religious, charitable or 
public benevolent institution, being a requirement made for or in 
accordance with the purposes or objects of that institution. 
(12) Sub-section (I) does not apply with respect to any conduct engaged 
in by a body corporate by way of restricting dealings by another body 
corporate if those bodies corporate are related to each other. 
(13) In this section-
(a) a reference to a condition shall be read as a reference to any 
condition, whether direct or indirect and whether having legal or 
equitable force or not, and includes a reference to a condition the 
existence or nature of which is ascertainable only by inference 
from the conduct of persons or from other relevant circumstances; 
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(b1 a reference to compettt1on, in relation to conduct to which a 
provision of this section other than sub-sections (8) or (9) applies, 
shall be read as a reference to competition in any market in 
which-
(i) the corporation engaging in the conduct or any body corporate 
related to that corporation; or 
(ii) any person whose business dealings are restricted, limited or 
otherwise circumscribed by the conduct or, if that person is a 
body corporate, any body corporate related to that body 
corporate, 
supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or 
services or would, but for the conduct, supply or acquire, or be 
likely to supply or acquire, goods or services; and 
(c) a reference to competition, in relation to conduct to which su~ 
sections (8) or (9) applies, shall be read as a reference to 
competition in any market in which the corporation engaging in 
the conduct or any other corporation the business dealings of 
whicti are restricted, limited or otherwise circumscribed by the ' 
conduct, or any body corporate related to either of those 
corporations, supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, 
goods or services or would, but for the conduct, supply or acquire, 
or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or services. 
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